



# **British Columbia Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Response Plan**

---

**Emergency Management BC  
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General**



Emergency  
ManagementBC

September, 2009





This plan identifies the intended actions to be taken in the management of the consequences of a CBRNE terrorist attack.



## FOREWORD

In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, it is now recognized that terrorist organizations are able to prepare, plan and execute activities that are not only complex in nature, but also may entail unusual and sophisticated methods. This has led to the current heightened level of awareness to the possibility of further attacks and the belief that terrorist or criminal groups may resort to the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear and/or Explosive (CBRNE) materials in such an attack. Arrangements for preparedness and development of capabilities to respond to such an attack in British Columbia is the responsibility of the provincial government organizations in conjunction with local, regional and national response agencies.

This British Columbia CBRNE Response Plan describes the Provincial Preparedness and Concept of Operations for responding to and managing the consequences of the terrorist or criminal use of CBRNE materials in a malevolent manner. Effective response and consequence management involves planning for, responding to and controlling the event to minimize the impact to life, infrastructure and the environment. Planning for a CBRNE event and working towards the ability to expediently respond to and mitigate its effects is risk-based and requires the mutual support of all levels of government as the only reasonable means of managing that risk is through mutual aid and cooperation leading to effective joint response.

This plan is specifically designed for CBRNE incident response management; it is based upon existing provincial and federal emergency preparedness plans and procedures (e.g., BC Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS), Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP), National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP), etc.). The BCERMS and FERP provide a framework for organizing and managing a coordinated and integrated provincial and federal response, and this plan provides specific guidance on issues related to terrorist or criminal use of CBRNE materials in support of these plans.

This plan is approved by the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP), a division of Emergency Management BC, and replaces all previous versions.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>FOREWORD .....</b>	<b>V</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS.....</b>	<b>VI</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>VIII</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES.....</b>	<b>VIII</b>
<b>SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>9</b>
1.1 Background .....	9
1.2 Purpose .....	9
1.3 Scope and Applicability.....	10
1.4 Legal Authority to Plan.....	10
1.5 Plan Description.....	10
1.6 Plan Currency .....	11
<b>SECTION 2 PLANNING BASIS.....</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1 General .....	12
2.2 Planning Scenarios.....	12
2.2.1 Chemical Event .....	13
2.2.2 Biological Event.....	14
2.2.3 Radiological-Nuclear Event.....	15
2.2.4 Explosive Event.....	16
2.3 Planning Assumptions .....	17
2.4 Phases of CBRNE Response .....	18
2.4.1 Preparation Phase .....	18
2.4.2 Prevention Phase.....	19
2.4.3 Response Phase.....	19
2.4.4 Recovery Phase.....	19
<b>SECTION 3 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .....</b>	<b>20</b>
3.1 Provincial Emergency Response Structure .....	20
3.1.1 Local Response.....	21

3.1.1.1	First Responders (On-Site) .....	21
3.1.1.2	Local/Regional Municipalities; .....	22
3.1.2	Provincial Response .....	23
3.1.2.1	Ministers-Deputies Emergency Committee .....	23
3.1.2.2	Central Coordination Group (CCG) .....	23
3.1.2.3	Provincial Emergency Coordination Center (PECC) .....	23
3.1.2.4	Provincial Emergency Operations Center (PREOC) .....	24
3.1.3	Provincial Ministries/Agencies .....	24
3.1.3.1	Role of Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General .....	24
3.1.3.1.1	Role of Provincial Emergency Program .....	24
3.1.3.1.2	Role of the Coroner .....	25
3.1.3.2	Role of Health Services .....	25
3.1.3.2.1	Role of Ministry of Health Services .....	25
3.1.3.2.2	Role of Regional Health Authorities .....	26
3.1.3.2.3	Role of BC Ambulance Service (BCAS) .....	26
3.1.3.3	Role of Ministry of Agriculture and Lands .....	27
3.1.3.4	Role of Ministry of the Environment .....	27
3.1.3.5	Role of BC Public Affairs Bureau .....	27
3.1.4	Federal Response .....	27
3.1.4.1	Role of RCMP "E" Division; .....	27
3.1.4.2	Role of the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team .....	27
3.1.4.3	Role of the National CBRNE Response Team .....	28
3.1.4.4	Role of the Canadian Forces .....	28
<b>3.2</b>	<b>Multi-Agency Response Team .....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>3.3</b>	<b>Coordination .....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>3.4</b>	<b>Communication (Operational) .....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>3.5</b>	<b>Communication (Public) .....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>SECTION 4</b>	<b>PREPARATION .....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>4.1</b>	<b>Planning .....</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1.1	Local .....	33
4.1.2	Provincial .....	33
4.1.3	Federal .....	34
<b>4.2</b>	<b>Capability development .....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>SECTION 5</b>	<b>CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>Concept of Operations .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>5.2</b>	<b>Prevention .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>5.3</b>	<b>Response .....</b>	<b>36</b>
5.3.1	Site Level Response .....	36
5.3.1.1	Initial Response .....	37
5.3.1.2	Multi-Agency CBRNE Response .....	37
5.3.2	Local Authority Response .....	38
5.3.3	First Nations Response .....	39
5.3.4	Regional Response .....	39

5.3.5	Federal Government Response .....	39
5.3.5.1	Federal Coordination.....	40
5.3.5.2	Government Operations Center (GOC) .....	40
5.3.6	Canadian Forces .....	40
5.3.7	Inter-Provincial Assistance .....	41
5.3.8	International assistance .....	41
<b>5.4</b>	<b>Recovery .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>ANNEX A</b>	<b>ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>ANNEX B</b>	<b>EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REGIONS.....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>ANNEX C</b>	<b>MAJOR EVENT COORDINATION .....</b>	<b>45</b>
	<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>50</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Chemical planning scenarios .....	13
Table 2: Biological planning scenarios.....	14
Table 3: Radiological and nuclear planning scenarios.....	15
Table 4: Explosive planning scenarios.....	16

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Provincial Emergency Response Management Structure .....	20
Figure 2: CBRNE Response Communication Plan.....	31
Figure 3: Major Event Communication Strategy .....	47



## SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

---

### 1.1 Background

Since the terrorist attack that destroyed the World Trade Centre and damaged the Pentagon in 2001, following other high-profile terrorist events such as the Tokyo Subway nerve agent attack and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the focus of the western world has been on the development of capabilities to detect, prevent and respond to such events. It is generally understood that terrorists have access to Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) materials, the knowledge and skills to use them, and the ability to strike anywhere in the world. The targets are normally focused on high-profile venues (e.g., major sporting events, large concentrations of populations, etc.) and as such, the risk of an event occurring increases with the visibility of the event. Events such as the Olympic Games and major political meetings (e.g., G-8 Summit, La Francophone Summit, etc.) are considered prime targets, and the threat of a terrorist CBRNE attack occurring during one of these high-profile events is increased.

Local governments have the primary responsibility for emergency response and recovery within their jurisdiction. The role of the provincial government in emergencies is in support of local authorities to coordinate the delivery of provincial and/or federal resources to the response and recovery operations. In addition to coordinating the response efforts, the provincial government will also manage the response in unorganized (i.e., unincorporated) communities or where the level of response is beyond the capability of local authorities.

In accordance with the *British Columbia Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS)* [reference A] structure, the provincial support is provided by means of an integrated government-wide response involving several ministries and agencies. This BC CBRNE Response Plan presents the provincial government framework for providing support to local authorities and First Nations in responding to intentional or accidental CBRNE events that impact British Columbia. As such, it supports other hazard-specific response plans that supplement more generic emergency response plans for the Province. This plan also describes the federal CBRNE response capabilities and the linkages to those resources.

### 1.2 Purpose

The purpose of the plan is to outline the coordinated response of provincial, regional and municipal organizations to a CBRNE terrorism event. However, this plan is not meant to be all-encompassing, and should be considered a supplementary plan to the larger provincial emergency response structure under BCERMS, including BCERMS Response Goals and components of the Incident Command Structure such as on-scene management, communication, PECC/PREOC/EOC operations, etc. Furthermore, the scope of this plan is limited to CBRNE events resulting from criminal or terrorist activities where higher levels of support (i.e., federal or inter-provincial) may be required, but does not include response to a Hazmat event.

As a provincial document, this Plan augments existing all-hazard emergency response plans among British Columbia ministries and crown corporations. All organisations with roles in CBRNE terrorist response are encouraged to draw principles and guidance from the concepts presented herein for their own planning purposes.

## 1.3 Scope and Applicability

This BC CBRNE Response Plan addresses CBRNE events severe enough to require the coordination of an integrated provincial response. The scope also includes any geographic area in the province that may be affected by a CBRNE event, keeping in mind that such an event can occur anywhere in British Columbia; however, the highest hazard is likely in the larger populated regions (e.g., BC Lower Mainland, Lower Vancouver Island, etc.).

This plan addresses all phases of CBRNE response including:

- Preparation (including planning and maintenance of capabilities);
- Prevention (including surveillance and interdiction);
- Response (including critical incident and consequence management response); and
- Recovery.

Recovery measures, including general infrastructure decontamination, repair and community reconstruction may require months or years of effort, and are beyond the scope of this plan. The Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) is responsible for collaborating with all emergency management stakeholders to address provincial coordination of recovery efforts with the understanding that recovery often occurs simultaneously with response actions following a CBRNE event.

## 1.4 Legal Authority to Plan

Authority for the Province to plan for CBRNE events resides within the *British Columbia Emergency Program Act* [reference B]. The *Act* and regulations established under the authority of the *Act* also specify the roles of British Columbia ministries, as well as the responsibilities of local authorities in British Columbia for overall emergency preparedness, response, and recovery.

## 1.5 Plan Description

This plan is divided into five sections as follows:

- Section 1 identifies the background, purpose, and scope of this plan as well as the authority under which this plan is promulgated;
- Section 2 presents the threat basis and the core planning assumptions considered in developing the guiding principles, central policies, and response framework;
- Section 3 details the roles and responsibilities of each agency/organization in a CBRNE response, including:
  - Provincial response structure;
  - The roles and responsibilities of the various local, provincial and federal agencies; and
  - Multi-agency response team, coordination and communication (operational and public) requirements;
- Section 4 outlines the preparation requirements for a CBRNE event including:

- Local, provincial and federal planning requirements; and
  - Capability development;
- Section 5 presents the concept of operations, which identifies how the provincial government will manage the response effort in collaboration with local authorities, First Nations, federal agencies, international support organisations, and other stakeholder agencies.

In addition, the following annexes are included:

- Annex A – Abbreviations, including definitions;
- Annex B – Emergency Management Regions, including operational areas; and
- Annex C – Major Event Coordination, including coordination between local, regional and provincial response assets with deployed federal resources during a major event (e.g., Olympics, G-8 Conference, etc.).

## **1.6 Plan Currency**

Emergency Management BC leads the provincial planning effort for CBRNE response on an ongoing basis, working with representatives at all government levels, First Nations, and with other stakeholder agencies.

PEP, on behalf of Emergency Management BC, will regularly review and refresh this British Columbia CBRNE Response Plan as required.



## **SECTION 2      PLANNING BASIS**

---

### **2.1    General**

The threat of a terrorist attack during a major sporting event, G8 Summit, Provincial Leaders Conference, etc. will be greater than the normal operational environment. Preparing to respond to a terrorist CBRNE event, including acquisition of equipment, training, exercising, etc. cannot be done in a short time period, and certainly cannot be developed in response to a short-term elevated threat. A basic CBRNE response capability must be developed based upon a credible "Planning Basis", which is a series of possible and/or probable biological, chemical, radiological and/or explosive scenarios that could occur with significant consequences. This basic level of preparedness can then be increased based upon specific elevated threats related to special events.

The planning basis for this plan is described in this section.

### **2.2    Planning Scenarios**

The planning scenarios detailed in this section are based on technical and scientific information from various governmental departments and agencies, and take into account scenarios from the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC) threat analysis and the Department of National Defence/Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Center for Security Science (CSS) CBRNE risk assessment. The Canadian threat assessment in some instances differs from that of other countries and in selecting the planning scenarios for this plan, all possibilities were considered including extremely unlikely events; however, only those that were deemed credible by Canadian authorities were included.

Each postulated scenario includes a description of the likely consequences of such an event, which becomes the planning basis for developing response capabilities for that event. Planning scenarios are regionally based, for example BC would not plan for a terrorist attack on a Nuclear Power facility, as BC does not have such a facility; however, a terrorist attack on a chemical tanker in the port is a credible scenario. In addition, triggers or indicators that a CBRNE event has taken place differ from one discipline to another and general guidelines are given for each event type. In most scenarios, there is a possibility of overwhelming the health facilities due to casualties, contamination and public concern (i.e., psychosocial effects) and this should be considered as a potential consequence in any CBRNE event.

It must be noted that the regional capability planning basis must also take into account the local Hazard/Risk Vulnerability Assessment (HRVA) in conjunction with these postulated CBRNE events. Synergistically, CBRNE response capabilities complement Hazmat capabilities, and are built on the core Hazmat response agencies within the community. Based on the combined CBRNE and Hazmat HRVA, a response framework is then developed including capabilities (e.g., detection, decontamination, medical countermeasures, etc.) necessary to safely respond to these threats.



## 2.2.1 Chemical Event

A chemical attack or emergency is normally the easiest to recognize as chemical agents have an immediate and noticeable effect on people and are normally accompanied by distinctive odors. Chemical threat planning scenarios are given in Table 1 and indicators include:

- A number of people displaying unusual behavior, signs or symptoms;
- Abandoned devices or packages;
- Laboratory equipment/apparatus set up in unexpected location;
- Unusual fogs, clouds, or mists (particularly indoors);
- Unexplained pools of liquid;
- Abnormal odors;
- Dead animals, birds or insects in the immediate area of concern;
- An explosive event; or
- Unexplainable illness (no evidence of source and/or lack of immediate logical cause).

**Table 1: Chemical planning scenarios**

<b>CHEMICAL</b>	
<b>Scenario C1</b>	<b>Attack on Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIC) facility</b>
Description	Attack against large-volume container of toxic chemical with the purpose of causing a release to the environment in a populated areas.
Potential Consequences	Contamination of a wide area causing numerous casualties and denial of use of the area for possibly an extended period of time.
<b>Scenario C2</b>	<b>Dispersal of toxic chemical agent</b>
Description	Atmospheric dispersion of a toxic chemical agent (e.g. VX) in a public area (e.g. metro system).
Potential Consequences	Depending on the agent, may or may not cause wide area contamination, but would result in a significant number of casualties.
<b>Scenario C3</b>	<b>Discovery of illicit chemical material</b>
Description	Triggered by intelligence or opportunity discovery at port or vehicle check-point, illicit material discovered upon entrance into Canada or on route to destination.
Potential Consequences	Limited or no consequences if no dispersal or dissemination occurs.
<b>Scenario C4</b>	<b>Chemical contamination of food or water</b>
Description	Contamination of local or large scale foodstuffs with a toxic chemical. The contamination can be inserted anywhere between the production and consumption chain.
Potential Consequences	Wide-spread illness.

## 2.2.2 Biological Event

Biological agents are normally odorless, colorless and require specialized equipment to detect, and it may be hours or days before effects are evident. As a result, it may be difficult to determine if a biological terrorist attack has even taken place. Community health care providers such as hospitals, medical clinics and family physicians may be the first to notice and report trends involving abnormal rates of peculiar symptoms to Public Health Officials. Laboratory analysis will likely be needed to confirm the presence of a particular biological agent. Recognizing a biological attack will include a careful evaluation of indicators such as:

- An unusual number of people displaying flu-like or other exposure symptoms;
- Unseasonable illness (e.g., the prevalence of flu-like symptoms in mid-summer);
- Unusual or unscheduled spraying;
- Laboratory equipment/apparatus set up in unexpected location;
- Abandoned spraying devices; and/or
- Large numbers of people simultaneously exhibiting food poisoning symptoms such as vomiting and diarrhea.

**Table 2: Biological planning scenarios**

<b>Biological</b>	
Scenario B1	Biological attack using infectious diseases (using people as a carrying agent or low-tech dissemination methods)
Description	People are infected through various means with the intent of spreading the disease.
Potential Consequences	Consequences would be determined by the type of pathogen and method of dissemination as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• low consequences for a non-communicable pathogen with limited contamination; and</li> <li>• very high consequences for an easily transmissible pathogen, which would be exacerbated if the subject(s) of the initial attack did not know they were victims until symptoms appeared.</li> </ul>
Scenario B2	Vector <sup>1</sup> delivery of bacteria, virus or Toxin
Description	Use of a vector delivery system to contaminate an area with a bacteria or virus.
Potential Consequences	Potentially high consequences depending on the timing of the delivery as vectors die quickly. Little contamination issues.
Scenario B3	Effective delivery of botulinum toxin
Description	Delivery of botulinum toxin in a closed area or by dissemination in food.
Potential Consequences	Could affect numerous public that are exposed and is lethal in very small quantities. Also poses an external contamination hazard.
Scenario B4	Discovery of illicit biological material
Description	Triggered by intelligence or opportunity discovery at port or vehicle check-point, illicit material discovered upon entrance into Canada or on route to destination.
Potential Consequences	Limited or no consequences provided that proper isolation and containment procedures are applied.

<sup>1</sup> the term "vector" means a living organism, or molecule, including a recombinant molecule, or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, capable of carrying a biological agent or toxin to a host

### 2.2.3 Radiological-Nuclear Event

Terrorists can expose people to radiation by deliberately positioning a radioactive source in a public area or disseminating radioactive materials through conventional means or by detonation of a “dirty bomb”, the deliberate contamination of drinking water, or the use of a nuclear weapon. Terrorists or criminals could also sabotage nuclear facilities or a radiological storage site.

Radioactive materials are detected using radiation detection instrumentation applicable to the type of radiation present (i.e., alpha, beta and/or gamma). Only very high levels of exposure to radiation cause any short-term health effects. As a result, it may be very difficult to recognize the terrorist use of radioactive material without specific detection or intelligence indicators (e.g., specific threats). Indicators include:

- Unusual number of sick people (e.g., nausea, vomiting, abnormal blood counts (late in the discovery process), etc.) with no discernable health issues (These effects may occur hours or even days after exposure);
- Inexplicable skin burns with no history of heat exposure (normally a sign of a very high level of radiation exposure);
- Unusual debris (unexplained bomb-like material);
- Containers displaying a radiation symbol; or
- Heat emitting or florescent material.

**Table 3: Radiological and nuclear planning scenarios**

<b>Radiological</b>	
<b>Scenario R1</b>	<b>Radiological contamination of food</b>
Description	Contamination of foodstuffs with a radiological substance.
Potential Consequences	Significant public concern and a possibility of a small number of people with high contamination and health impacts.
<b>Scenario R2</b>	<b>Detonation of a Radiological Dispersal Device detonation (i.e., dirty bomb)</b>
Description	Detonation of a conventional explosive device attached to, or laced with, radioactive material.
Potential Consequences	Possibility for numerous casualties, and contamination of bystanders (possibly on a mass scale) and area surrounding and downwind of the explosion.
<b>Scenario R3</b>	<b>Discovery of illicit radiological material</b>
Description	Triggered by intelligence or opportunity discovery at port or vehicle check-point, illicit material discovered upon entrance into Canada or on route to destination.
Potential Consequences	Limited or no consequences provided that the material is isolated and shielded.
<b>Scenario R4</b>	<b>Mass exposure of the public to radiation</b>
Description	Placement of a relatively strong radioactive source in a location where it exposes the public in the vicinity to radiation, with increasingly larger sources having higher potential impacts.
Potential Consequences	Possibility of high radiation exposure to the public in the surrounding area.



<b>Scenario R5</b>	<b>Dispersion (non-explosive) of a radiological/nuclear substance</b>
Description	Dispersal of a radioactive material in a populace area by means other than an explosive device (e.g., ground dispersal or through ventilation system or airborne/blower type dissemination system).
Potential Consequences	Possibility for contamination of bystanders (possibly on a mass scale) and area surrounding and downwind of the release.
<b>Nuclear</b>	
<b>Scenario N1</b>	<b>Discovery of a portable nuclear device</b>
Description	Triggered by intelligence or opportunity discovery at port or vehicle check-point, illicit material discovered upon entrance into Canada or on route to destination.
Potential Consequences	Limited or no consequences provided that the material is isolated and rendered safe (detonation with nuclear yield is not considered a credible threat).

## 2.2.4 Explosive Event

Due to the extreme and immediate effects from a conventional explosive detonation, no indicators are required.

**Table 4: Explosive planning scenarios**

<b>Explosives</b>	
<b>Scenario E1</b>	<b>Large Vehicle Improvised Explosives Device (IED)</b>
Description	Detonation of a vehicle-borne IED containing 500 – 1000 kilograms of explosives.
Potential Consequences	Significant loss of life (possibility of hundreds of deceased depending on the circumstances) and damage to buildings/property.
<b>Scenario E2</b>	<b>Person-delivered Improvised Explosives Device</b>
Description	Perpetrator places IED (1-5 kilograms of explosives) in heavily populated area and leaves the scene. IED is initiated by remote means (e.g. radio control, time delay, etc.).
Potential Consequences	Injuries to several and loss of life in the order of 30 persons. Some damage to buildings/property.
<b>Scenario E3</b>	<b>Suicide Bomber</b>
Description	Perpetrator conceals IED (1-5 kilograms of explosives) on his person and initiates it in a heavily populated area.
Potential Consequences	Injuries to several and loss of life in the order of 30 persons. Some damage to buildings/property.
<b>Scenario E4</b>	<b>Improvised Incendiary Bomb</b>
Description	An improvised device containing flammable liquids.
Potential Consequences	Possibility of numerous casualties and damage to property due to the resulting fire.
<b>Scenario E5</b>	<b>Large Improvised Incendiary Bomb</b>
Description	IED placed on a bulk fuel tank (e.g., gasoline, propane, etc.).
Potential Consequences	Possibility of a significant number of casualties and property damage due to the resulting explosion and large fire.

## 2.3 Planning Assumptions

The possible consequences of a terrorist CBRNE attack in BC are detailed for each event in the scenario tables above. In the case of a significant CBRNE attack or event it must be assumed that there could be severe consequences, and a coordinated, joint response would be required. Local authorities (or even the provincial authority) retain responsibility for the emergency response aspects to such an event at all times. The response would be a joint effort from multiple agencies from across the province as no one municipality would likely have sufficient capability to conduct a full response without external assistance, even though the responsibility for overseeing the response within their jurisdiction remains. The police of jurisdiction would provide the initial response to the criminal or terrorist components of the event, and would request support from the provincial police, which in the case of BC is the RCMP. The RCMP would be supported by the Pacific Region CBRNE Response Team, and may request support from the Canadian Forces (CF) and/or the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (E-INSET) as the situation dictates.

In development of this plan, the following response assumptions have been used:

Individual Response – Most residents would likely not know what to do following a CBRNE event to protect themselves and their families other than to flee the scene and report to a medical facility. This action may further exacerbate the situation if the release is ongoing causing further exposure to the individuals, and possibly contaminating the medical facilities and exposing health care workers. There would be a high reliance on the local, regional and provincial response authorities to provide informative broadcasts including information on protective actions and measures for the public;

Local Authority Response (i.e., area having jurisdiction) – Each municipality should have emergency response plans that are based upon a HRVA for their region of responsibility, which can form the basis of response to a CBRNE event. It is reasonable to assume that local authorities would survive the event to coordinate response functions; however, it is unlikely that each municipality will have the necessary resources to respond to the event and would rely on assistance from surrounding municipalities and/or provincial assets. There is a requirement for agreements between municipalities to share resources, including preparatory joint training and exercising;

Health Authorities Response –

- Local Hospitals are First Receivers in a CBRNE scenario and will contend with contaminated patients who will self-present and decontaminated patients that will be transported by EMS and render acute and on-going care;
- Public Health – The provincial Public Health laboratories and expert scientific knowledge and guidance are accessed through the BC Centre for Disease Control.
- NESS – Specific CBRNE pharmaceutical stockpiles can be accessed through the NESS program, administered by Public Health Agency of Canada.
- Local health facilities will develop capability for mass decontamination of contaminated patients resulting from a CBRNE event over time, at a level appropriate to their operational context, and will take appropriate interim measures to ensure the best possible response, pending implementation of a full stand-alone capability.



First Nations Response – Similar to other local authorities, First Nations authorities should have emergency response plans based on the regional HRVA, but are not likely to have the necessary resources to respond to a CBRNE event and would rely on assistance from surrounding municipalities and/or provincial assets;

Regional Response – There may be a requirement for regional coordination of the local authority level of response where impacts are multi-jurisdictional, either through regional district support to local authorities and First Nations, or through another authority;

Public Health – The provincial Public Health laboratories and expert scientific knowledge and guidance are accessed through the BC Centre for Disease Control.

Provincial Response – All Provincial Regional Emergency Operations Centres (PREOCs) have response plans based on the BCERMS structure, and the additional hazards imposed by a CBRNE event, as identified in this document, will be integrated into these regional plans including identification of response agencies and requirements for liaison and coordination of these assets; and

Federal Response – The federal government response to terrorism in Canada is led by the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET), supported by the National CBRNE Response Team (NCBRNE RT), which is to be notified once a CBRNE event has been determined to be the result of terrorist activity. Should the provincial government also require resources beyond their own capabilities in response to a CBRNE terrorist event; the federal government will be requested to respond in accordance with the federal *Emergency Management Act* [reference C], which designates the federal responsibilities for emergency management in Canada. In addition, the Privy Council Office *Strategic CBRNE Protection Plan* [reference D] and the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada *CBRN Strategy for the Government of Canada* [reference E] detail the specific responsibilities of each federal department in assisting in the response to a CBRNE event in Canada.

## 2.4 Phases of CBRNE Response

This CBRNE terrorist response plan is based on the following phases:

### 2.4.1 Preparation Phase

The goal of the Preparation Phase is the development of an integrated multi-agency response capability that includes first response agencies (e.g., fire, police, EMS) as well as support organizations and agencies (e.g., Health, Coroner, Environment, Agriculture, etc.) that would play a role in the response.

The Preparation Phase includes all efforts to plan and prepare for a CBRNE terrorist event including:

- Plan and procedures development;
- Response asset development including
  - Identification of response resources; and
  - Equipment acquisition;
- Training, including in a multi-agency response environment; and
- Exercising, again in a multi-agency construct.

### **2.4.2 Prevention Phase**

The Prevention Phase includes all components of ongoing prevention and interdiction through surveillance of persons, buildings, vehicles, commodities, etc. for the presence of CBRNE material and/or devices with the intent of preventing the occurrence of an incident. This phase is primarily an intelligence and/or security function (i.e., Police, CSIS, CBSA, TC, CNSC, PHAC, BCCDC and others) with the support of other agencies as required.

### **2.4.3 Response Phase**

The Response Phase includes both critical incident response and consequence management. Critical incident response involves all aspects of rendering safe or defeating improvised CBRNE devices, containment and mitigation of the effects of released CBRNE material, and the recovery of evidence related to the criminal/terrorist act. Aspects of consequence management are also included in the Response Phase, as the consequences of a CBRNE event can go beyond the immediate scene of the event (e.g., a plume of chemical or radioactive contaminant can be carried downwind and cause a secondary effect at a location remote from the original CBRNE event). Consequence management response includes public protective measures (e.g., sheltering/evacuation of the affected population), victim rescue, medical response and measures to minimize the impact to infrastructure and the environment.

### **2.4.4 Recovery Phase**

The Recovery Phase includes longer term public protection and all aspects of incident recovery including relocation of the affected population and large area decontamination and remediation to return the affected area to normal or unrestricted use. The longer term protective and remediation efforts, including general infrastructure decontamination, repair and community reconstruction may require months or years of effort, and are not within the scope of this plan.

## SECTION 3 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The provincial emergency response structure and the roles and responsibilities of the organizations and agencies within that structure, including the requirements for interoperability between these agencies, are detailed in this section. In addition, emergency coordination and communication details are also presented in this section. The focus is on CBRNE response, thus this section spotlights those aspects of the organizations responsibilities vice generic emergency response as detailed in the BCERMS manual.

### 3.1 Provincial Emergency Response Structure

The BC integrated emergency response management structure is based on the BCERMS and is depicted at Figure 1.




Figure 1: Provincial Emergency Response Management Structure



### 3.1.1 Local Response

The local/regional response capabilities for CBRNE are based upon the existing Fire/Hazmat, Police and Emergency Medical Services (EMS). These agencies will lead the on-scene response efforts with the objectives set out in priority as follows [reference A]:

- provide for the safety and health of all responders;
- save lives;
- reduce suffering;
- protect public health;
- protect government infrastructure;
- protect property;
- protect the environment; and
- reduce economic and social losses.

#### 3.1.1.1 First Responders (On-Site)

In their roles as first responders, fire, police and EMS assets must be prepared to respond to all hazards, including those that would be unique to a CBRNE event. The additional aspects related of the response to a terrorist action involving CBRNE materials include:

- Capability to recognize the CBRNE material;
- Capability to identify (where appropriate) the CBRN material;
- Capability to protect responders from the effects of the material (through appropriate application of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)); and
- Capabilities to mitigate its effects, including containment, render safe, decontamination (personnel and equipment) and remediation.

The organizational construct of a multi-agency CBRNE response team differs from a standard response organization. In the standard construct, each agency has its own command and control organization and works independently or within a joint command structure; however, each agency maintains its own command and control of its personnel. In a multi-agency construct, there is one team with one command organization within which each agency participates and brings its unique capabilities. In a CBRNE environment resulting from terrorist or criminal actions the multi-agency organization would be responsible for the following tasks, many of which are similar to standard response functions, but the types and spectrum of agents may be different:

- Police:
  - Management of the criminal aspects of the event;
  - Security and crowd control, including maintenance of the established control perimeter;
  - Extended evacuation of public in affected areas (outside of hot zone) beyond that required in a standard hazmat event;
  - Enforcement of quarantine and/or evacuation orders;
  - Security for municipal, regional and provincial infrastructure;

- Explosive render safe and disposal procedures (albeit this capability is limited to the RCMP and very few local police services (e.g., Vancouver Police Department));
  - Collection of evidence and criminal oversight of the event; and
  - Forensic identification;
- Fire:
  - Establishment of the security perimeters (i.e., hot-warm-cold zones) and maintenance of the perimeters through survey and confirmation of the zone limits;
  - Detection and identification (where appropriate to the response) of the CBRN contaminant;
  - Search and rescue and hot zone extraction of casualties;
  - Management of personnel working in the hot zone (i.e., ensuring appropriate protective equipment is used, monitoring time in zone, medical rehabilitation and re-hydration, psychological screening, etc.); and
  - Decontamination of personnel, equipment and area as required;
- EMS:
  - Critical care of responders and casualties;
  - Supporting simultaneous treatment and decontamination of patients;
  - Treatment and transport of casualties;
  - Provision and application of appropriate medical countermeasures and
  - Supporting management of responders through medical support, re-hydration, psychological monitoring, etc.

### **3.1.1.2 Local/Regional Municipalities;**

Local authorities remain responsible for managing and conducting their own emergency operations center(s) in support of site-level operations. Local authorities in an area may also jointly manage CBRNE emergency operations centers to facilitate an integrated response with each other and/or their regional districts. Initial response will be conducted based on the existing emergency response capacity within the municipality. For a CBRNE event there will likely be a requirement for support from surrounding municipalities, regions and the province, and when local capacity is exceeded, local authorities will request assistance from the provincial government by directing such requests to the PREOC in the region. The exception is for police and fire services, which are responsive to local authorities but follow their own chains of command for provision of support resources.

Procedures and protocols for facilitating the CBRNE emergency response management and appropriate notifications should be prepared and detailed in local/regional plans.

### **3.1.1.3 Local/Regional Health Facilities**

Local Hospitals are responsible for protecting people and facility from contamination, and providing care to patients. Specific roles include

- Receive patients and ensure that no cross contamination between clean and contaminated persons
- Triage and decontamination of contaminated, self presenting patients
- Appropriate treatment of all patients

### **3.1.2 Provincial Response**

The province is committed to minimizing the impact of a CBRNE terrorist event on the provincial residents, infrastructure and the economy. Even though local governments have the primary responsibility for response and recovery from the consequences of a CBRNE event, it is understood that these efforts will likely be well beyond the ability of any one municipality to manage. The province, when requested by a local government or if the event occurs in an unorganized community, will provide resources and emergency management assets in accordance with the BCERMS and as amplified in this plan.

The construct outlined in this provincial CBRNE response plan forms the basis upon which each municipality/region is to develop and maintain its response capability, either through development of a regional multi-agency response asset or via inter-regional agreements for cooperation and aid in the case of a CBRNE event. Regardless of the approach, there remains a staunch requirement for development and maintenance of ongoing CBRNE response capabilities within the province, and Emergency Management BC will oversee and support these ongoing developmental efforts.

#### **3.1.2.1 *Ministers-Deputies Emergency Committee***

The Ministers-Deputies Emergency Committee is made up of the key ministers and deputies who are involved in the management of the response of an emergency. Their primary responsibility is to provide high-level policy direction to ensure that the BC governmental human and material resources from all ministries, crown corporations and agencies are committed in support of the overall governmental response. In the case of a CBRNE event, the key ministries would comprise:

- Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (PEP, Coroner and Police Services);
- Ministry of Health Services;
- Ministry of Agriculture and Lands; and
- Ministry of the Environment

#### **3.1.2.2 *Central Coordination Group (CCG)***

The CCG is activated to facilitate the cross-government and multi-agency coordination of response activities. The CCG is co-chaired by the PEP Executive Director and the Public Safety Canada (PSC) Regional Director and, for a CBRNE emergency, the Director of Police Services. The CCG is made up of representatives of the concerned ministries (as noted above) as well as other public safety stakeholders and federal support coordinators. The CCG provides strategic and policy direction to the Director of the Provincial Emergency Coordination Center regarding response planning, response support and coordination.

#### **3.1.2.3 *Provincial Emergency Coordination Center (PECC)***

The PECC is responsible for the management of provincial level resources on behalf of the CCG in support of the emergency needs of the operational area(s). Its role is to manage and coordinate mutual aid between regions (PREOCs) and at the provincial central level, and for coordination and communication with the federal response support structure.

The PECC will be activated in the case of a terrorist CBRNE event both to support its primary role of managing provincial resources, but also to coordinate the cooperation between the



local/regional/provincial response assets and INSET that has the mandate for the criminal oversight of terrorism.

#### **3.1.2.4 Provincial Emergency Operations Center (PREOC)**

The PREOC function is the management of the multi-agency/ministry coordinated response within the specific geographical area for which it is responsible in accordance with the direction and priorities of the CCG. The PREOC coordinates the multi-jurisdictional response activities through the local/regional Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and deploys provincial, federal and international resources in accordance with provincial priorities and regional requirements.

Provincial emergency management regions (PREOC's) are included at ANNEX B.

### **3.1.3 Provincial Ministries/Agencies**

#### **3.1.3.1 Role of Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General**

The emergency management responsibilities of the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General are fulfilled by PEP and the Coroner's office.

##### **3.1.3.1.1 Role of Provincial Emergency Program**

The standard activities that PEP conducts in an emergency are detailed in the *BCERMS Overview* manual [reference A] and in general are as follows:

- Assign the PEP Director to act as co-chair of the CCG;
- Establish and coordinate staffing of the PECC and PREOC(s) as well as support services and staff on a 24 hours basis. Provincial staff may be assigned to support emergency response efforts via assignment to the operation through the Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System (TEAMS);
- Appoint PREOC Directors and Deputy Directors as necessary for each phase of the response;
- Provide overall direction for finance at the PECC and PREOC levels; and
- Compile impact assessments and forecasts.

In particular, for a CBRNE emergency response, the following activities are also the responsibility of PEP:

- Determine response in consultation with appropriate stakeholders and advise on the extent of the coordinated regional/provincial response;
- Coordinate the preparation of provincial CBRN response directives;
- Coordinate the response with provincial ministries and agencies and local/regional authorities, including the requirements for sheltering and/or evacuation of the public in affected areas; and
- Assist in issuing tasking orders and public information advisories and warnings.

The intention of terrorism and in particular the use of CBRNE materials in an attack is to cause (among other things) panic and loss of public trust in the government. The importance of public information during a CBRNE emergency is key to prevention of public panic, voluntary mass evacuation and overwhelming of health resources.

### **3.1.3.1.2 Role of the Coroner**

The coroner's role in a CBRNE emergency response is to investigate sudden and unexpected deaths of all persons in accordance with Part 2 of the *BC Coroners Act* [reference F]. The coroner's response is multi-disciplinary, and investigations may draw upon varied subject matter experts and facilities/laboratories to meet legislated responsibilities including:

- Identification of the deceased;
- Cause and manner of death;
- Disposition of remains; and
- Recommendations to prevent further loss of life under similar circumstances.

The BC Coroners Service will participate in unified command and is responsible for examination of the scene to fulfill their legislated requirements including the search for and recovery of human remains. In addition, the Coroner will provide:

- a suitable facility to conduct forensic examination of CBRN contaminated human remains including deployment of a temporary morgue facility to the site as the situation dictates; and
- a means to store contaminated human remains until final disposition can be facilitated, including safe, isolated and refrigerated storage.

The role of the coroner is complicated by the likelihood that decedents would be contaminated with CBRN material that would make the remains a hazard to both investigators and examiners, possibly for an extended period of time. The Coroner must provide a safe means for disposal of contaminated human remains (e.g., cremation, burial or otherwise) as traditional methods may not be satisfactory due to the contamination. Specialized protective equipment must be available to facilitate handling, forensic examination and disposal of contaminated remains.

Due to the risks of fulfilling their role in a CBRN contaminated environment, all Coroners (including consultants and examiners that may be contracted by the Coroner) must receive the requisite personal protection training prior to entering or working in such an environment.

### **3.1.3.2 Role of Health Services**

#### **3.1.3.2.1 Role of Ministry of Health Services and Healthy Living and Sport**

The role of the Ministry of Health Services (MoHS) is to directly support and coordinate health emergency response capabilities for the province in conjunction with health sector organizations and other health sector partners. For a CBRNE emergency, this may require close liaison with federal scientific and health agencies (e.g., Public Health Agency of Canada for bio-warfare materials, Health Canada for radiological contaminants, DND for chemical warfare agents, etc.), as the treatment for CBRN exposure may be beyond the standard health care functions of the regional health facilities.

The Ministry of Health Services is responsible for development of plans that mandate implementation measures for provision of a medical surge capacity to deal with a possible CBRNE event with numerous contaminated casualties that is beyond the capability of the regional health care facilities. In addition, the Ministry of Health Services is also responsible to ensure Health Authorities take appropriate steps to adequately train and equip health responders in protective measures for the management and treatment of CBRN contaminated casualties.



The Ministry of Healthy Living and Sport, through the Provincial Health Officer, supported by the BC Centre for Disease Control, supports preventative and investigative actions of Health Authorities in response to CBRNE events, through provincial level epidemiological surveillance and science based advice and information.

#### **3.1.3.2.2 Role of Regional Health Authorities**

Under the direction of the Ministry of Health Services, the Regional Health Authorities (RHA) are responsible for the delivery of medical services to the general public and in the case of a CBRNE terrorist event, to the casualties. The unique nature of a CBRNE event may require specialized capabilities that may complicate the delivery of medical services, such as:

- Critically injured contaminated casualties that could potentially pose a hazard to health care responders;
- Mass contaminated casualties;
- Non-standard health care treatments for exposure to CBRN materials; and
- Isolation of individuals or groups as required.

Regional Health Authorities are responsible to ensure:

- Health care facilities develop and maintain CBRN response plans and procedures;
- Health responders are adequately trained on protective measures, and appropriately equipped to manage and treat CBRN contaminated casualties;
- Health care facilities develop and maintain a CBRN decontamination capability appropriate to each facility's operational context and, if necessary, establish agreements with local fire/hazmat and/or BCAS for the provision of decontamination services in case of a large number of contaminated casualties; and
- Adequate supply of medical countermeasures is available.

It is expected that following a CBRNE event, the public that have left the scene may be contaminated and will self-present at health care facilities. It is essential that plans and procedures take into account the eventuality that contaminated casualties will enter the health care facility, and appropriate measures must be taken to minimize the spread of contamination as well as decontamination and treatment of the affected individuals. Inter-agency training and exercising is necessary to develop the skills necessary to ensure the protection of health care workers as well as the general patient population at the affected facility.

#### **3.1.3.2.3 Role of BC Ambulance Service (BCAS)**

BC Ambulance Service has the primary role of providing emergency life-saving medical care and transportation services for the sick or injured throughout the entire province. In a CBRNE event, BCAS would provide life-saving medical care in a CBRNE environment, and in a mass casualty CBRNE event with numerous contaminated victims, BCAS would also support decontamination, with a goal of ensuring patients are decontaminated prior to transport.

In its role as primary transport for the sick or injured, BCAS would also ensure the affected Health Authority, as well as neighboring Health Authorities, are notified of the event and given details on the types of injuries and expected arrival of patients.

In addition to the above, where BCAS is the first responder to the scene or in locations where Hazmat assets are not available, BCAS would provide a level of critical incident support to

include information regarding the extent of the event and initial indication of the nature of the event (i.e., CBRNE related), and expert based recommendations through the Technical Advisor Program.

#### **3.1.3.3 *Role of Ministry of Agriculture and Lands***

The Ministry of Agriculture and Lands (MAL) has the provincial responsibility, in conjunction with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, for protection of the animal and plant health within the province, including detection, investigation and final disposition management of diseased, infected or otherwise unfit food supplies. In a CBRNE terrorist event, MAL would be responsible for the evaluation and management of any affected plants or animals that may eventually be available for human consumption. Contamination of plants or animals by a CBRN material may make them unfit for consumption and/or a hazard to those individuals that are managing or processing them, necessitating the appropriate disposal of the affected food supply.

#### **3.1.3.4 *Role of Ministry of the Environment***

The Ministry of Environment's (MOE) has the provincial mandate to monitor, assess and provide guidance for Hazmat events when a responsible party is identified. In absence of a responsible party or if the responsible party does not initiate an effective response, BC MOE will assume the response role and mitigate and/or remediate the Hazmat event.

A CBRNE terrorist event would likely involve an agent that could be considered a hazardous material, and the primary role of the MOE would be to oversee the remediation of the scene in conjunction with local/regional and likely national agencies.

#### **3.1.3.5 *Role of BC Public Affairs Bureau***

The BC Public Affairs Bureau (PAB) has the primary responsibility for development of the provincial communications strategy following activation of the provincial emergency management structure, including coordination with the Provincial Emergency Coordination Center (PECC) Chief Information Officer to ensure all provincial agencies implement the strategy.

### **3.1.4 *Federal Response***

#### **3.1.4.1 *Role of RCMP "E" Division;***

The RCMP "E" Division provides policing services to the vast majority of BC and is designated as the Provincial Police service.

Under the *Security Offences Act* [reference G], the RCMP is responsible to perform the duties of peace officers as it relates to offences that would constitute a threat to the security of Canada. In the case of a CBRNE terrorist event (which would be considered a national security threat), the RCMP would respond to the terrorist component of the CBRNE event in support of the local or regional police of jurisdiction

#### **3.1.4.2 *Role of the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team***

The INSET (in the case of BC, E-INSET) has the federal mandate for the criminal investigation and management of any terrorist activity in Canada including a CBRNE event. INSET is made



up of representatives of the RCMP, federal partners and agencies such as Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and provincial and municipal police services that work collectively to prevent criminal activities (major or minor offences) by terrorist groups or individuals who pose a threat to Canada's national security.

#### **3.1.4.3 Role of the National CBRNE Response Team**

The NCBRE RT provides specialist support to INSET at the scene of a terrorist or criminal CBRNE event. The NCBRE RT consists of RCMP, Canadian Forces (CF) and Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) assets that provide advanced CBRNE detection, identification and mitigation capabilities. The team is fully capable of working in a CBRNE environment; however, their mandate and functional capacity may not permit them to support local response functions (e.g., public and area decontamination). The team may be able to provide some assistance to local response efforts as their available capacity and fulfillment of their primary mandate permits.

#### **3.1.4.4 Role of the Canadian Forces**

Canada Command, represented in BC by Joint Task Force Pacific (JTF(P)), would coordinate with the province to provide Canadian Forces support to BC in the aftermath of a CBRNE event including:

- Emergency engineering support;
- Assistance to law enforcement agencies;
- CRN detection and monitoring; and
- Limited emergency first responder decontamination support.

### **3.2 Multi-Agency Response Team**

A CBRNE event response includes the capability to assess, manage and mitigate the consequences of explosives and/or the release of CBRN materials, either accidentally or as part of a criminal/terrorist attack. This response is best managed through the development of a multi-agency CBRNE Team(s) that can respond safely and effectively to a CBRNE event. The multi-agency team will have the capability to:

- Conduct presumptive identification of released CBRNE materials;
- Define containment areas;
- Manage the consequences (mitigate the effects) of the threat materials/devices;
- Render-safe CBRNE devices;
- Rescue, decontaminate, treat and transport victims to the hospital as required;
- Protect responders;
- Protect the public;
- Minimize the impacts on property and the environment;
- Protect, gather and process evidence safely, according to law; and
- Provide technical advice regarding business resumption, and public access within the affected areas.

The multi-agency response to a CBRNE event is an integrated team that includes:



- Police assets that will ensure public order, conduct high risk searches for CBRNE materials/devices, carry out render-safe procedures on intact CBRNE devices and undertake crime scene procedures to recover, package and transport evidence. Police assets include:
  - Police Explosive Disposal Unit (EDU);
  - Police Forensic Identification Service (FIS);
- Fire Hazardous Material (Hazmat) Response Unit - Fire Hazmat will conduct a hazard assessment including presumptive identification of CBRNE materials, a site survey and establishment of contamination/exclusion zones. Fire Hazmat personnel will also carry out rescue operations to remove victims from the CBRNE environments, mitigate the effects of CBRNE materials as well as decontaminate on-site victims, responders, and equipment;
- Emergency Medical Services (EMS) - EMS will conduct health assessment and provide life saving medical care to victims/responders, advise/administer prophylaxis agent counter-measures, transport injured persons to hospitals and advise public health agencies as required; and
- Additional agencies that support the response efforts, primarily in the recovery phase, include:
  - Coroner – management of deceased;
  - Health Authorities – management of medical care for casualties;
  - Provincial Health Services Authority – disaster psychosocial support for responders and casualties
    - BCCDC – Public Health Labs, expert scientific knowledge and guidance, access to NESS pharmaceutical stockpiles
  - Ministry of Environment – remediation of contaminated area.
  - Ministry of Agriculture and Lands – management of contaminated food supplies (plant and animal); and

Each region that could be assessed as high-risk to be targeted for a CBRNE terrorist attack should develop a multi-agency response capability through:

- Establishment of a regional CBRNE response program authority;
- Development of a threat-based response plan and programs that includes agreements for regional cooperation to provide an integrated multi-agency CBRNE response team(s) as appropriate; and
- Identification of multi-agency response assets, either as an integrated team or on a recall basis;

Once a multi-agency team is established, there must be an integrated training and exercise program to maintain the effectiveness and efficiency of the team. Each member of the team is to receive common training to assist in response activities that includes:

- Site safety training (CBRNE recognition and self-protection methods);
- Collective training in a multi-agency environment (common skills training at all levels in the team and across all professions (e.g., command and control, decontamination, evidence handling, etc.));
- Collective exercising in CBRNE response at the local, regional and provincial level to maintain proficiency (e.g., 4-6 times annually to include table-top, command post and field training exercises);

- Refresher training, both professions-related and team training in all areas as required; and
- Conduct of fit testing of PPE annually (minimum).

A large-scale provincial CBRNE response exercise is to be conducted every 2-3 years, and as a minimum prior to a major event (e.g., national/international sporting event, major political event, etc.) where the threat of a CBRNE terrorist attack may be heightened.

### **3.3 Coordination**


Coordination includes those activities that support the provincial management of a CBRNE event including:

- PECC/PREOC staffing and management;
- Financial and administrative management; and
- Personnel management.

Coordination information and instructions are given in *BCERMS PREOC Operational Guidelines* manual [reference H] and the *EMBC EOC Operational Guidelines* manual [reference I].

### **3.4 Communication (Operational)**

The provincial communication plan for a CBRNE response is given at Figure 2. Communication between On-Scene Command, Local/Regional EOC's and the Provincial EOC should follow the chain of command as depicted as much as possible to ensure continuity of information and appropriate resource allocation (i.e., no duplicate allocation of critical resources from Tier 2 and 3 to Tier 1).



**Figure 2: CBRNE Response Communication Plan**

In accordance with the BCERMS, there must be a dedicated effort to ensure that telecommunications systems, planning and information flows are being conducted in an effective manner. Standard protocols and terminology are used at all levels and plain language for all telecommunications is used to reduce the confusion that can be created when radio codes are used. Standard terminology and formats are used to transmit information, including strategic modes of operation, situation reports, logistics, tactical operations and emergency notifications of imminent safety concerns. Each agency is to establish operational guidelines to support the escalation of operations from small to large or from routine to unusual without requiring major changes or transitions. Normal site communications typically involve two-way radio and cellular telephones. The following are the primary telecommunications methods by priority for the upper three BCERMS levels (EOC, PREOC and PECC):

- Telephone (land line);
- Radio Telephone (cellular, satellite);
- Two-way Radio (amateur, commercial); and
- Video-Conferencing.
- Teleconferencing bridges

- Web conferencing

Communications systems should provide reserve capacity for unusually complex situations where effective communications could become critical. An integrated communications plan is to be developed as part of each organization's response plan noting that the transmission of emergency messages and notification of imminent hazards is to take priority over routine communications.

### **3.5 Communication (Public)**

In addition to an operational communication plan for management of the response activities, a public communication plan is required in each region. Key public affairs considerations during a CBRN event are:

- The public has a need to know and the government an obligation to supply information about a terrorist or emergency event;
- The need to provide accurate and timely information to the public to calm anxiety and provide protective instructions (e.g., in-home sheltering, evacuation routes, sheltering locations, etc.);
- The media is the main conduit for information flow to the public and it is essential that the media receive the correct information in a timely manner; Agencies from all sectors will work closely to ensure timely and appropriate information to assure health, safety and security is provided to the public.
- As crises and emergencies are normally cross jurisdictional, communications coordination of all implicated organizations is essential to ensure federal, provincial and municipal governments can exchange and disseminate important public information quickly and accurately to avoid conflicting messages by the various levels of government; and
- Providing information to international allies and organizations.

In BC, emergency public information will be managed in accordance with the *BC Crisis Communications Strategy for Major Provincial Emergencies (2004)* [reference J].



## SECTION 4 PREPARATION

---

Preparation is one of the four phases of CBRNE management, but is included separately from the Concept of Operations section as it does not directly deal with operational issues. This section outlines planning and capability development requirements at all levels for a joint multi-agency response organization(s) within the province.

### 4.1 Planning

#### 4.1.1 Local

In accordance with the *BC Emergency Program Act* [reference B], local authorities are responsible for the direction and control of emergency response within their jurisdiction and must prepare (or cause to be prepared) emergency plans respecting preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters.

Local/regional plans must delineate not only generic governmental areas of responsibility but specifics about the command structure during the critical incident response phase. All components of the plans must be based on a risk analysis of the most credible threats for the given region, including the CBRNE planning scenarios presented in this document, and must also include directions for operational deployment of resources at all levels. It is understood that each municipality or region is not capable of developing or maintaining a comprehensive CBRNE response capability and reliance upon mutual aid is essential between regions and the province as a whole. Each regional plan must also outline the agreements for mutual response and aid with neighboring municipalities and with surrounding regions in support of the response to a CBRNE event.

Plans should also include a means of disseminating, monitoring and utilizing threat information to escalate/relax the protective posture. Prevention is primarily a security function, but it also calls for an integrated approach between municipal/provincial and national assets with expertise in these areas. Plans should include all linkages to surveillance and prevention processes currently in place (i.e., CBSA, RCMP, CSIS, ITAC, TC, HC, PHAC, BCCDC, etc).

#### 4.1.2 Provincial

Local agency response to a CBRNE event must be coordinated with provincial and federal agencies for support in mitigation and consequence management efforts. This coordination will follow the BCERMS structure that has been established for the management and assignment of resources from the provincial and/or federal levels in support of on-scene operations. To that end, Emergency Management BC will lead the development and maintenance of CBRNE planning by ensuring appropriate measures are taken at all levels within the province.

Provincial resources would be provided by the appropriate ministries and agencies coordinated by PEP through the PECC/PREOC command structure as detailed in this plan. In addition, once it has been determined to be a criminal or terrorist event, the scene is to be treated as a crime scene and preservation of evidence is to be considered primary following preservation of life. The RCMP "E" Division has primary responsibility for provincial law enforcement and would provide criminal investigation support to the local authorities (when requested) with the support of the Pacific Region CBRNE Team and E-INSET.

### 4.1.3 Federal

The INSET has the mandate for the intervention and investigation of a terrorist CBRNE event; however, the local response agencies will retain control of the overall response. The INSET will be supported by the NCBRE RT; however, they do not have the resources to provide general emergency support (e.g., detection, survey, public health response, decontamination, etc.) to the event; thus, the consequence management responsibilities remain with the province and local responders.

In addition to the 'local' RCMP and the NCBRE RT, federal support would also come through other means such as the *Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP)* [reference K] or the *Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP)* [reference L]. Federal support includes scientific and consequence management resources to support the protection of the public, infrastructure and environment as well as remediation efforts through the provision of additional resources, advanced detection and identification equipment, laboratory analysis, expert technical and medical advice and countermeasures.

## 4.2 Capability development

Capability development is achieved through advanced CBRNE training, acquisition of CBRNE detection and monitoring equipment as well as decontamination capabilities (both personnel and equipment/area). Training and experience in the use of this equipment is mandatory to the delivery of a proficient response capability, and continual refresher training is necessary to maintain this proficiency.

Response agencies must develop the requisite skills within their own profession as well as working together to develop the capability to provide a joint multi-agency response for a CBRNE event (i.e., multi-discipline across multiple municipalities). The hazards associated with a CBRNE event necessitates that all personnel that are working in the environment must have appropriate and consistent CBRNE equipment and procedural training, including the requisite personal protective equipment (PPE) and support services. No single agency can conduct all aspects of the response without the support from the others (e.g., police/RCMP would have criminal jurisdiction, and the Coroner has jurisdiction over the deceased, but both would require support of Fire Hazmat, EMS and Health services in personnel health and safety management within the hot zone) making a multi-agency response construct mandatory for countering a CBRNE event.

The development and maintenance of multi-agency CBRNE response assets takes considerable time and effort, and cannot be done in quick response to an event once it happens. The multi-agency response construct requires not only the cooperative efforts of all response agencies (e.g., fire, police, EMS, etc.), the municipalities and regions must also develop and maintain integrated plans and inter-agency and inter-municipality agreements.

The maintenance of the multi-agency response organization relies on interoperability between regions, which in turn relies upon mutual understanding and assistance, cooperation and joint capability development through training and exercising. A joint training and exercise program must be included local and regional plans, as the ability to interoperate while working in a high-threat CBRNE environment relies on a trust-base between agencies that is developed through common training, exercising and foremost through field experience. The training plan must be

an all-agency approach, as a mass casualty event would not only pose a significant challenge to response organizations, it would also tax the entire health care system.

The local/regional multi-agency training/exercise program will act as a means to validate the local plans and resolve interoperability issues. Additionally, the requirement for interoperability training/exercising is increased based on the scale of the event, such as a major sporting event or political summit and the risks they represent. For normal operations, local/regional training is sufficient; however, in preparation for a major event, provincial/national interoperability training will also be conducted at the discretion of Emergency Management BC.



## **SECTION 5      CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

---

### **5.1    Concept of Operations**

For each of the response phases of a CBRNE event, a description of the management principles for the phase is outlined including the responsibilities of each of the organizations in the phase.

### **5.2    Prevention**

Prevention is the ability to detect the illicit import, trafficking or movement of material that could be used in CBRNE events. During this phase all components of prevention and interdiction through surveillance of persons, buildings, vehicles, commodities, and other entities for the presence of CBRNE material and/or devices with the intent of preventing the occurrence of an incident. The threat environment must be monitored, and surveillance activities escalated based upon the current threat state

Prevention includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Border vehicle and person monitoring to detect the presence of radioactive, nuclear and potentially chemical and explosive materials in transit;
- Port container screening to detect the presence of radioactive, nuclear and potentially chemical and explosive materials in transit;
- Mail screening to detect the presence of chemical, radioactive, nuclear and explosive material in transit;
- Transport vehicle (e.g., trucks, trains, ships, etc.) monitoring, screening and regulation enforcement to detect the presence of, or properly identify, chemical, radioactive, nuclear and explosive material in transit;
- Airport passenger screening to detect the presence of chemical, radioactive, nuclear and explosive material in transit and prevent hijacking;
- Monitoring of airways for illegal air traffic;
- Food and tap water sampling and analysis to detect the presence of chemical, biological and radioactive material; and
- Intelligence collection and sharing.

### **5.3    Response**

Once a CBRNE event has been recognized, a focused response is to be staged as detailed in this section.

#### **5.3.1    Site Level Response**

Immediate response to a CBRNE event is the responsibility of the local municipality and/or regional CBRNE response team in accordance with local/regional plans, and the general activities outlined in this section are required in the initial stage of the response.



#### **5.3.1.1 Initial Response**

CBRNE critical incident response is based on the premise that the initial first responders (e.g., fire, police, EMS, etc.) on the scene will conduct the initial size-up and reconnaissance including:

- recognize the possibility of a CBRNE event and notify the appropriate CBRNE response organization;
- secure the site and take necessary measures to protect the public; and
- conduct rescue operations within their capabilities.

There may be more than one crime scene, and appropriate precaution must be taken to protect responders and the public from possible secondary blasts or CBRN material releases. In all cases, until the forensic evaluation is completed, the forensic law-enforcement authority remains in charge of the scene and all operations within the scene.

Technical/scientific support may be provided remotely by technical personnel (e.g., EDU or Hazmat technician, public health official and/or federal resources (e.g., CANUTEC, DND/CRTI CBRN Scientific Clusters, NCBRE RT, BCAS Technical Advisors, etc.)) until the CBRNE response resources arrive on site. Based on technical advice, the first responders will conduct emergency decontamination of victims (wash down and clothing replacement) and transport to medical facilities as necessary. Depending on the situation, victims may have to be provided with protective equipment (e.g., respirators) and held in isolation until a CBRNE response team(s) can conduct appropriate decontamination. Finally, the initial responders will maintain site security until relieved.

#### **5.3.1.2 Multi-Agency CBRNE Response**

Once the CBRNE response team is activated and deployed, the response is to include the activities outlined below.

##### **Hazard Assessment**

An initial hazard assessment is to be conducted to identify the risk to the responders and the public so that protective actions may be implemented to reduce the consequences of an ongoing or pending release of CBRNE materials or explosive hazard. Hazard assessments are conducted in two stages:

- Stage one is an initial assessment based on site information, safety protocols and responder training. The aim of the initial assessment is to detect and identify and minimize obvious threats to responders and the public; and
- Stage two is a detailed assessment using instrumentation to confirm the initial assessment (i.e., identify the CBRNE materials), normally conducted after render-safe procedures have been implemented.

##### **Render Safe**

Render safe procedures are to be conducted to prevent the functioning of a hazardous device, thereby eliminating environmental release of CBRN materials and/or explosive blast effects. In

addition, while conducting render safe action, mitigation actions are to be taken to reduce the impacts on responders, the public, property and the environment should a blast and/or release of CBRN material occur.

### ***Rescue Operations***

Rescue operations are to be conducted to remove victims from harm, including search and recovery of people trapped in buildings/rubble. Wherever possible, victims are to be removed away from the CBRNE hazard or, if not possible or feasible, the CBRNE hazard should be removed away from the victims.

### ***Contamination Control***

Contamination control and decontamination throughout the operation is essential to minimize the effects of CBRNE material on persons, animals and the environment.

The public at the scene may have been contaminated and will require decontamination, possibly on a mass scale. A screening program is required to determine the extent of the contamination and to determine which persons are to be decontaminated. Decontamination operations must be commenced on a priority basis as the longer the exposure of persons to many CBRN contaminants increases the severity of the effects.

The Incident Commander, with scientific support advice, is also to determine if site decontamination is within the team's capability and take steps to minimize the spread of the contaminant(s) through use of equipment and area decontamination procedures. Where decontamination is beyond the capability of the response team, assistance is to be requested from higher authority via the appropriate EOC/PREOC.

### ***Demobilization***

Once the scene has been handed over to the appropriate remediation authority, the responder agencies are to return to their "ready state", including:

- servicing vehicles;
- refurbishing/replacing supplies and equipment;
- financial accounting and operational audits;
- stress debriefings; and
- reporting and updating plans and procedures.

## **5.3.2 Local Authority Response**

A local EOC is to be activated when required to provide support to site level operations. The local EOC will provide support assets to the response scene as required by the Incident Commander as well as provide for off-scene response, including:

- Collection of situational information;
- Liaison with external resource agencies;
- Assessment of infrastructure damages;
- Management of hazardous material;
- Emergency social services;

- Security, including sheltering/evacuation of the public as required; and
- Engineering support for local authority owned utilities (power, water, drainage, etc.).

### **5.3.3 First Nations Response**

The Letter of Understanding between PEP and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) acknowledges certain legal requirements concerning emergency response and recovery operations on reserve land. Response and recovery costs for emergency management activities impacting reserve lands are the responsibility of the federal government.

Following a CBRNE event on reserve land, PEP will assist, support, or arrange for all emergency response measures including coordinating local authority, provincial, federal or other agency support as stipulated under the existing protocol arrangement with INAC. If an incident is reported directly to PEP via the ECC, PEP will notify INAC as soon as possible. INAC may activate their own Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System members and to contact the First Nations Emergency Services Society, which will assist and support First Nations communities through all phases of the emergency

### **5.3.4 Regional Response**

Depending on the severity of the event, the regional PREOC and the PECC are to be activated to support the local EOC(s). The PREOC and/or PECC will arrange for additional support assets to the local EOC and the on-scene response through regional agencies, authorities and service providers, as well as through inter-provincial agreements and requests for federal support via the provincial government.

In addition to arranging direct support to the scene, the region can also provide the following:

- Hospitals - Hospitals provide medical support to CBRNE team members and victims
- Health Authorities - There may be a requirement to set up mass screening for a large segment of the public depending on the type and extent of the contamination.
- Provide Public Health information/health advisories, expert and scientific knowledge and guidance.
- Public Information – Provides information to the media, sets up a media center as the situation dictates and coordinates media briefings by appropriate individuals (e.g., OSC, Director of EOC/PREOC or PEP, etc.);
- Public Health - Public Health provides public information/health advisories, expert and scientific knowledge and guidance. and assumes care of victims (once they have been decontaminated); and
- Provincial Coroner - The Provincial Coroner assumes custody of human remains that have been decontaminated (or as otherwise arranged).

### **5.3.5 Federal Government Response**

The province is able to request federal support in any emergency situation through the FERP and/or FNEP. The response capabilities of the federal agencies and organization to a CBRNE response include:



- INSET – The INSET has jurisdiction over the criminal response to a terrorist CBRNE event and must be notified as soon as possible after the event has been determined to be caused by such activity;
- DND/CRTI scientific clusters, DRDC Suffield, Public Health Agency of Canada, CNSC and Provincial Labs - These scientific assets are capable of advanced identification of CBRNE materials as well as providing expertise in management of the extended consequences of the release of these materials into the urban domain; and
- Environment Canada - Environment Canada provides advice/guidance on weather patterns, plume prediction and environmental issues relative to the dispersal of CBRNE materials.

The capabilities of the above agencies includes, but are not limited to, the following

- Providing expert CBRNE protection advice;
- Detecting, measuring and characterizing CBRNE agents;
- Supporting crime scene(s) management through:
  - Sample taking and forensic evidence collection and handling;
  - Supporting forensics in a potentially contaminated environment;
- Specialized medical treatment of NCBRE RT members;
- Communicating and maintaining situational awareness; and
- Public protection recommendations (e.g., sheltering, evacuation, etc.).

#### **5.3.5.1 Federal Coordination**

Public Safety Canada coordinates requests for federal emergency management assistance through the mechanisms and processes outlined in the FERP [K] and/or FNEP [L]. Request for federal assistance is to be made through the provincial chain of command. In response to a request, Public Safety Canada will work to identify regional federal resources first, and then look to bring other resources from outside the region as needed. A federal liaison officer from Public Safety Canada will be present in the PECC and PREOC to facilitate coordination of federal and provincial information and operations.

#### **5.3.5.2 Government Operations Center (GOC)**

The GOC is the federal government's strategic level operations centre, manned by a variety of federal departments and agencies including the RCMP, DND, Health Canada, Foreign Affairs, PHAC, CSIS, etc. The GOC maintains contact with the provinces and territories as well as international partners such as the US and NATO. The GOC operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, gathering information from other operations centres and a wide variety of sources, both open and classified, from around the world. The GOC's primary function is to provide coordination and direction on behalf of the government of Canada in support of emergency operations.

#### **5.3.6 Canadian Forces**

The Commander of Joint Task Force Pacific can order the initial deployment of local Canadian Forces resources in response to an emergency where there is an immediate requirement to save human life, prevent serious injury, or protect property. The sustained and deliberate employment of Canadian Forces assets requires formal approval, and is coordinated by Public Safety Canada as part of the integrated federal response. When Canadian Forces support is

provided, Canadian Forces personnel remain under command of the designated military commander, but will be responsive to the Incident Commander, local authority or the Province of British Columbia as appropriate.

### **5.3.7 Inter-Provincial Assistance**

Request for and coordination of inter-provincial support is to be requested through and coordinated by the province.

### **5.3.8 International assistance**

Similarly, request for international assistance in support of a CBRNE response is to be requested through the province to the GOC.

## **5.4 Recovery**

The longer term protective and remediation efforts required to recover from a CBRNE event are the responsibility of the local, regional and provincial authorities, and the requirements are not within the scope of this plan.

## ANNEX A ABBREVIATIONS

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
AECL	Atomic Energy Canada Limited
ALEA	Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies
BC	British Columbia
BCAS	British Columbia Ambulance Service
BCERMS	British Columbia Emergency Response Management System
CAP	Civil Assistance Plan
CANUTEC	Canadian Transport Emergency Center
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear, and Explosives
CBSA	Canadian Border Services Agency
CCG	Central Coordination Group
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CEPR	Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response
CF	Canadian Forces
CNSC	Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CRTI	CBRNE Research Technology Initiative
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSS	Center for Security Science
CWA	Chemical Warfare Agent
DGNS	Director General Nuclear Safety
DND	Department of National Defence
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
EC	Environment Canada
EDU	Explosive Disposal Unit
EMBC	Emergency Management British Columbia
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FERP	Federal Emergency Management Plan
FIS	Forensic Identification Service
FNEP	Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan
FRAT	Federal Radiological Assessment Team
Hazmat	Hazardous Material
HRVA	Hazard/Risk Vulnerability Assessment
GOC	Government Operations Center
HC	Health Canada
HRVA	Hazard Risk Vulnerability Assessment
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INAC	Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
INSET	Integrated National Security Enforcement Team
ITAC	Integrated Threat assessment Center
JTF(P)	Joint Task Force (Pacific)
MAL	Ministry of Agriculture and Lands
MOE	Ministry of the Environment
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCBRNE RT	National CBRNE Response Team
NCTP	National Counter-Terrorism Plan



NML	National Bio-Medical Laboratory
NOC	National Operations Center
NRCan	Natural Resources Canada
OSC	On-Scene Commander
PAB	Public Affairs Bureau
PECC	Provincial Emergency Coordination Center
PEP	Provincial Emergency Preparedness
PHAC	Public Health Agency of Canada
PREOC	Provincial Emergency Operations Center
RPB	Radiation Protection Bureau
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
TC	Transport Canada
TEAMS	Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System
TIC	Toxic Industrial Chemical
TIM	Toxic Industrial Material

## ANNEX B EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REGIONS

Provincial Emergency Management Regions and PREOC operational areas are outlined below.



## **ANNEX C MAJOR EVENT COORDINATION**

### **MAJOR EVENT MANAGEMENT**

During a major event, such as the Olympics, G8 Summit, etc., additional Federal support resources may be pre-deployed to assist local agencies in managing the security and emergency response requirements. In addition, international resources may also be available such as US support through the *Civil Assistance Plan (CAP)* [reference M]. This annex outlines the coordination between local/regional/provincial resources and the deployed Federal and/or international resources.

### **RCMP DEPLOYMENT**

When deployed in support of a major event, the RCMP in conjunction with local/regional police forces has responsibility for security including intelligence and intervention, security of venues and protection of dignitaries. In addition, the NCBRE RT may also be deployed, which retains national responsibility for prevention and response to CBRNE terrorist events (including crime scene preservation and collection of forensic evidence).

### **DEPLOYMENT OF FEDERAL SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES**

Depending on the threat level associated with the event, there may also be an increased possibility of terrorists using state-of-the-art CBRNE materials and methods necessitating the requirement to deploy federal scientific resources for operational support to the NCBRE RT. The federal scientific capabilities exist as a result of the federal consequence management responsibilities for specific CBRNE emergencies under the Emergency Management Act as amplified in federal support plans (e.g., FNEP, FERP, etc.). In addition to supporting the NCBRE RT, these federal resources can also support local response efforts through provision of advanced detection, identification, medical countermeasure and treatment capabilities, and technical advice and resources in support of recovery and remediation.

The federal response assets include the following:

- Chemical – The federal support organization (overseen by the lead of the CRTI/Chemical Cluster) is comprised of personnel from the following departments:
  - Environment Canada (EC);
  - Defence Research and Development Canada Suffield (DRDC(S)); and
  - Health Canada (HC);
- Biological – The federal support organization (overseen by the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)) is comprised of PHAC personnel from the following:
  - National Biomedical Laboratory (NML); and
  - Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response (CEPR);
- Radiological/Nuclear - The Federal Radiological Assessment Team (FRAT), established in support of the FNEP, will provide all federal RN resources. The FRAT is comprised of personnel from the following departments:
  - Health Canada - Radiation Protection Bureau (HC/RPB);
  - Defence Research and Development Canada Ottawa (DRDC(O));
  - DND - Director General Nuclear Safety (DGNS);



- Natural Resources Canada (NRCan);
- Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC);
- Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL);
- Environment Canada (EC);
- Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA); and
- Transport Canada (TC).

## **INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT**


Request for international assistance must be routed through the provincial government to the GOC. International assistance will be considered when the situation is beyond the capability of Canadian resources (local, regional, provincial and federal) to manage. The most likely avenue for assistance will be through the Canadian-US Civil Assistance Program (CAP), which provides a framework for the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the other nation in the performance of civil support operations (e.g., floods, fires, hurricanes... and terrorist attack). The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is responsible on behalf of the government of Canada for facilitating requests for international military response through the CAP, and the Minister of Public Safety is responsible for coordinating the federal response in crisis and consequence management situations within Canada. Assistance from US Forces may only be authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defence with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

When deployed, the US Forces will remain under the command and control of the appropriate US Command authority. Command relationships within Canada between Canadian and US Forces will be defined based upon the circumstances of the operation and delineated in respective national operation and execution orders. Canada Command will retain operational command of the support operation and within BC, Joint Task Force Pacific (JTF(P)) would coordinate with the province to provide Canadian and US Forces support to the CBRNE event.

## **SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS**

The INSET has the national mandate for criminal investigation a terrorist CBRNE event both within the ongoing event venue(s) and the urban domain; however, the local authority and response agencies have the responsibility for the response to the event. Regardless of where a CBRNE event should occur, the local and regional response resources would be required to provide assistance in the Response Phase and would assume control in the Recovery Phase; thus, coordination of the joint response between local/regional assets and the RCMP ISU/National CBRNE Response Team (NCRNE RT) is required.

During the event, the deployed NCRNE RT will stand up a National CBRNE Coordination Center (NCC) where they will coordinate the response to suspected or real CBRNE events. The deployed federal support assets will be available to the NCRNE RT to provide an integrated approach to the operational phase, where their primary responsibility will be to provide scientific support and technical advice to the NCRNE RT. The primary communication channel between the NCRNE RT and the local/regional authorities is through the PREOC. However, due to the requirement for close coordination between the NCRNE RT assets and the local response agencies, there will also be direct communication between the NCRNE RT and the On-Scene response assets via a joint command structure. The overall communication coordination strategy is given at Figure 3.



**Figure 3: Major Event Communication Strategy**

For each of the operational phases of CBRNE terrorist event, a description of the federal and international support functions is outlined below, including the inter-linkages with the local, regional and provincial support functions.

### **Prevention**

During the prevention phase, the RCMP (including the NCBNE RT and other federal scientific assets) would support all aspects of prevention through interdiction and surveillance of suspected CBRNE threats. These federal assets would work in conjunction with local agencies to monitor intelligence and the evolving threat environment as well as supporting interdiction through joint response to possible CBRNE situations (e.g., suspicious packages, white powder event, suspicious activities, etc.). In addition, the federal deployed assets would provide some or all of the following services in direct support of the major event:

- Background baseline surveying to identify the normal presence of chemical, naturally occurring and/or legitimate biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive material;
- Pre-event venue sweeps (conducted before key events) to detect the illicit presence of chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive material;

- Venue entry screening for the presence of radioactive, nuclear and, subject to technical limitations, chemical and explosive material;
- Public area random area monitoring and detection to detect the presence of radioactive, nuclear and explosive material and some chemical materials; and
- Mail screening to detect the presence of chemical, radioactive, nuclear and explosive material in transit to a controlled area. (Irradiation techniques may be used to defeat biological agents);
- Port container screening to detect the presence of radioactive, nuclear and explosive and, subject to technical limitations, chemical agents;
- Food and tap water sampling and analysis to detect the presence of chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear material; and
- Intelligence sharing;

### **Response**

If an emergency occurs, the INSET would fulfill their responsibility for management of the criminal aspects of the CBRNE event. The NCBNE RT would support the INSET; however, they would then return to their role of prevention and interdiction to prevent further terrorist action. The deployed federal scientific assets would maintain their support to the NCBNE RT, but would support provincial needs for assistance in accordance with national priorities.

The deployed federal scientific resources would support local/regional operations in the incident response as follows:

- Providing expert CBRNE protection advice;
- Detecting, measuring and characterizing CBRNE agents;
- Supporting crime scene(s) management through:
  - Sample taking and forensic evidence collection and handling;
  - Supporting forensics in a potentially contaminated environment;
  - Specialized medical treatment of NCBNE RT members;
  - Communicating and maintaining situational awareness; and
  - Public protection recommendations (e.g., sheltering, evacuation, etc.)

The responsibility for consequence management rests with the local and provincial authorities, and shall be conducted in accordance with the existing provincial plan for response to emergencies involving hazardous material resulting from an accident or as a result of a malevolent act. If the consequences of the emergency are such that they are beyond the capacity or capability of the province to manage, the province may request Federal support under the FERP and/or FNEP. Upon such a request, even though their primary mandate is support to the NCBNE RT, the deployed federal scientific resources may be requested to provide assistance and support to the province until such time as relief federal resources can be deployed. Federal scientific assets would support provincial authorities in accordance with the provisions detailed in relevant federal plans including the following:

- Ensuring a smooth transition of responsibilities among the NCBNE RT, municipal/provincial authorities and federal consequence management resources;
- Analyzing hazards;
- Surveying hazards;
- Modeling potential dispersion of contamination and real-time prediction (extent of contamination, public dose, etc.);



- Tracking actual dispersion of contamination;
- Characterizing and assessing contamination;
- Recommending measures to protect the public (i.e., sheltering and evacuation);
- Protecting emergency workers from the effects of exposure to radiation;
- Monitoring the contamination of the general public;
- Decontaminating the general public;
- Providing technical and scientific advice;
- Food and water monitoring;
- Transportation restrictions and/or quarantine requirements;
- International/Foreign visitors and dignitary management;
- Providing logistic support (medical, psychosocial, critical infrastructure support, command and control, communications, transport, equipment, resources etc.);
- Coordinating with NGOs to ensure interoperability;

### ***Recovery***

Federal resources would continue to support during the remediation phase; however, this could take a significant time and effort to remediate and return the affected area to unrestricted use and is beyond the scope of the plan.

## REFERENCES

- 
- [A] British Columbia Emergency Response Management System Overview (Interim), September 2000;
  - [B] British Columbia Emergency Program Act;
  - [C] Canadian Emergency Management Act, Department of Justice, 2007;
  - [D] V2010 Olympic & Paralympic Games – Strategic CBRNE Protection Plan, Privy Council Office, January 2009;
  - [E] The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Strategy of the Government of Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 2005;
  - [F] British Columbia Coroners Act, [SBC 2007] Chapter 15;
  - [G] Security Offences Act, Chapters S-7, 20 May 2009;
  - [H] British Columbia Emergency Response Management System PREOC Operational Guidelines (Interim), February 2001;
  - [I] Emergency Operations Centre Operational Guidelines, 2nd Edition, Justice Institute of British Columbia, Emergency Management Division;
  - [J] British Columbia Crisis Communications Strategy for Major Provincial Emergencies (2004), Public Affairs Bureau;
  - [K] Federal Emergency Response Plan, Public Safety Canada, June 2008;
  - [L] Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan, Health Canada, Fourth Edition, May 2002;
  - [M] Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan, CANUS CAP-08, Canada Command and United States Northern Command, 14 February 2008;