NR

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Smith, George AG:EX" < George.Smith@gov.bc.ca>

Date: November 27, 2017 at 11:43:41 AM PST **To:** "Eby, David AG:EX" < <u>David.Eby@gov.bc.ca</u>>

Subject: FW: Sydney presentation

Minister,

Here is a copy of the Sydney presentation re: "The Vancouver Model"

From: GEOSMITH [mailto:George.Smith@gov.bc.ca]
Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 11:42 AM

To: Smith, George AG:EX

To: Smith, George AG:EX **Subject:** Sydney presentation

Impact of Chinese Transnational Crime on Australia: Intelligence Perspectives

Paper delivered at the New South Wales Police Force Ifocus Conference, November 2017

John Langdale
Department of Security Studies and Criminology
Macquarie University
john.langdale@mq.edu.au

27-Nov-1

Outline of presentation

- I focus on three issues in transnational crime from southern China which affect Australia
 - Supply side: southern China (Guangdong province)
 - -Facilitators: Hong Kong and Macau
 - Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs

27-Nov-17

Focus of presentation

- Supply side: Southern Chinese transnational crime (focus on Guangdong province)
 - Trafficking of illegal drugs (methamphetamines, precursor chemicals) to Australia
 - · Counterfeit goods trafficking
 - Associated money laundering flows back to China and Hong Kong
 - -Future changes in Guangdong: What are the implications for transnational crime?

27-Nov-17

Focus of presentation

- Transnational crime needs facilitators (bankers, accountants, lawyers) to arrange deals
 - Hong Kong is a key hub for these facilitators
 - -Macau is a secondary hub
 - -Implications for Australian money laundering?


27-Nov-1




Focus of presentation

- Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs: Impact on transnational criminal activity in Australia?
 - -Latin American criminal gangs
 - -European criminal gangs
 - -North Korea
 - -Vancouver (Canada)

22.80m.17





Supply perspectives: Transnational crime and money laundering in southern China

27-Nov-1

Transnational crime in southern China

- Guangdong is a significant source of Australia's transnational crime
 - Illegal drugs (particularly precursor chemicals and methamphetamines)
 - Counterfeit goods
 - Wide range of transnational crime in Guangdong (illegal betting syndicates, illegal timber, ivory, wildlife, "boiler room" and fake CEO scams, etc)

27-Nov-17

Transnational crime in southern China

- Guangdong is an good location for production and trafficking of illegal goods and services
 - World-class global logistics networks underpinning trafficking of illegal drugs, counterfeit goods and other illegal activities
 - Presence of a skilled workforce and equipment (printers, packaging) as well as unskilled people wanting employment
 - Close proximity to business and financial services in Hong Kong
 - Strong linkages with the global Chinese diaspora

27-Mov-1

Transnational crime in southern China

- Complexity of criminal activity in Guangdong
 - Enormous difficulties in unraveling the criminal participants and money laundering intermediaries within the province and in Hong Kong
 - Flexible networks in the legal and illegal economies (complex and fluid sub-contracting networks)
 - Guangdong has changed significantly in the past ten years and will continue to change in the future
 - The province grew rapidly using low-wage migrant labour, but these workers are needed less now

27-Now-1

Transnational crime in southern China

- Complexity of criminal activity in Guangdong
 - Shift into high technology products and services industries
 - -Impacts on crime?
 - Fewer male migrant workers who were prone to join criminal gangs
 - Fewer low-end counterfeit factories (likely to have spread to other regions in China); more technology intensive fakes
 - More cyber crime given the higher technology skills of the workforce

27-Now1

Facilitators of Asian financial crime: Hong Kong and Macau

27-Hzs-17

Hong Kong and Macau: Facilitators of Asian financial crime

"Mainland-based criminal groups typically engage in large-scale ATS production and export, while Hong Kong- and Taiwan-based groups finance large drug shipments in the role of lender and insurer. These latter criminal syndicates are involved in illicit market activities, protection services, loan sharking, 'money trail' avoidance services, and stock market manipulation, and use the financing of drug shipments as an investment." (Broadhurst, Roderic 2017 Asia's law enforcers face synthetic drug proliferation, Jane's Intelligence Review, 30 Je.)

Hong Kong and Macau: Facilitators of Asian financial crime

- Hong Kong and Macau play a significant role in facilitating transnational financial crime affecting Australia
- Hong Kong is a major centre for global and Asian banking and business services
- Macau has the world's largest casino turnover and a history of facilitating crime, money laundering and capital flight
- Both cities have well-established networks of facilitators skilled at shifting money overseas via offshore banking and finance

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Secrecy in Hong Kong's financial and business services
 - Hong Kong is ranked the second most secret offshore financial centre on the Tax Justice Network's global ranking
 - Hong Kong is a major global location for shell companies which are heavily used by Chinese, North Korean and global criminals
 - -They provide anonymity for criminals

77-No+17

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Aslan financial crime

- Hong Kong plays a key role in offshore finance for China
 - The Panama Papers leak found that many wealthy and politically connected Chinese used Mossack Fonseca's services to access offshore markets
 - Mossack Fonseca is one of the many Hong Kong based financial intermediaries facilitating such transactions
 - Unfortunately, this type of information is rarely obtained

27 No+17

Hong Kong and Macau facilitate capital flight from China

- A complex topic that is beyond the scope of this presentation
- Most of the flows are not of concern to Australian law enforcement agencies (e.g., currency speculation and capital diversification)
- However, capital flight from corrupt Chinese officials and/or Chinese criminals is a concern
- Australia must rely on cooperation with the Chinese government

27-Nov-17

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Hong Kong provides global criminals with access to global financial markets
- Case study: The "Russian Laundromat"
 - Around US\$20 billion were laundered out of Russia by Russian criminals in the period 2010-14 (possibly up to US\$80 billion)
 - Hong Kong banks (HSBC, \$545 million) and Chinese banks (Bank of China, \$715 million) played a significant role in the laundering of Russian money
 - Unfortunately, this information is a one-off and it is difficult to follow it up given the hazards of investigating organised crime in Russia

27-Nov-17

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Australian implications
 - "Russian Laundromat": No information on whether any money from the money laundered by Hong Kong based (or London) banks ended up in Australia
 - Hong Kong plays a key destination role in money laundering of Australian illegal drug sales
 - Panama Papers: The ATO has revealed that about 80 of the 800 Australians being investigated following the Panama Papers leak match the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission's serious and organised crime intelligence database (including bikie gangs involved in various criminal activities)

Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs

27-Nov-17

Global and local criminal gangs

- Europol has identified the growing problems faced by law enforcement agencies from global and European criminal gangs
 - Many Organised Crime Groups are highly flexible and display great adaptability in the speed with which they adjust their business models to changes in the environment. Many criminal groups are increasingly complex and require a variety of skills as well as technical expertise to carry out activities. (Europol 2017 European Union. Serious and Organised Crime Assessment. Brussels, p.11)
 - Europol has also identified that ethnic-based criminal gangs are forming alliances with other criminal groups

Chinese global criminal gangs

- Mahlmann, Ning-Ning 2005 Chinese Criminal Enterprises, Washington, D.C., FBI
- Key characteristics are:
 - Global linkages via the Chinese diaspora
 - Fluid nature of operations (form new ventures and dissolve them)
 - Sophisticated operations (High degree of coordination, planning and good technical and business knowledge)
 - Global mobility of members
 - Financial strength (Operate in legal and illegal businesse
 profits from Illegal activities are placed in legal firms
 and reinforce the group's financial strength)

Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs

- Australian law enforcement agencies face new challenges from alliances between Chinese, global and local criminal gangs
- Advantages of such alliances include:
 - Pool their respective strengths (Chinese criminal gangs have excellent global distribution networks)
 - Rapidly move into new markets and
 - Take advantage of weak links in the global economy
- The following four case studies illustrate these points

Case study 1: Alliances between Latin American and Chinese criminal gangs

- -- Traffic cocaine to Hong Kong for China and Asia-Pacific markets
- Money laundered from Colombia to Hong Kong as well as through Macau casinos
- Traffic precursor chemicals and counterfeit goods produced in Guangdong to Latin America and globally
- Parallels with the Black Market Peso Exchange used by Colombian criminal gangs for cocaine trafficking to the U.S.
- These gangs have also diversified into people smuggling from China to Latin America and then to the U.S.

Case study 1: Alliances between Latin American and Chinese criminal gangs

- These global criminal gangs are like multinational corporations which operate global networks and use the transport and business services infrastructure of southern China
- They trade opportunistically in what each region has specialised in (Southern China has methamphetamines, precursor chemicals, counterfeit goods and a supply of illegal migrants, while Latin America has cocaine)

25.80ma 17

Case study 2: Alliances between Chinese and European criminals

- The European alliance model is quite different from the first case study
- Spain: ICBC and European criminal gangs
- · Italy: Bank of China and Italian criminal gangs
- While the case study does not involve Australia, it does provide a possible model for the Asia-Pacific region

27-Nov-1

Case study 2: Alliances between Chinese and European criminals

- Global implications?
 - Chinese criminal gangs operated a regional hub-andspoke operation with Tuscany in Italy and Madrid in Spain being the hubs; collected financial transfers within Europe, before sending them onto China
 - Imports of counterfeit goods, illegal drugs; local extortion, prostitution and sweat shops with illegal migrants; profits laundered out of Italy and Spain to China
 - Alliances with local criminal gangs (Camorra in Naples)
 - Key role of Chinese banks and money transfer services in money laundering

Global implications of European case studies

- Do Chinese criminal gangs operate regional huband-spoke operations in (the Asia-Pacific?
 - Have Chinese criminal gangs formed alliances with local criminal gangs? (e.g., bikie gangs in Australia?)
 - —If so, what are the money laundering implications?
 - —Are Chinese banks and money transfer firms operating in Australia engaged in money laundering activities similar to those in Europe?

Case study 3: History of alliances between North Korea and Chinese criminal gangs

- Illegal drug production (North Korea) and global distribution (Chinese criminal gangs) (1990s and early-2000s)
 - Australian case study: Pong Su case in 2003 (Up to 125kg of heroin was imported)
- Counterfeit cigarettes: North Korea (production) and Taiwanese and Chinese criminal gangs (global distribution)
- Banco Delta Asia case in 2005 (counterfeit US\$100 notes) produced by North Korea and distributed by Chinese banks

Case study 3: Possible alliance between North Korea and Chinese criminal gangs

- Bangladesh Bank cyber heist of 2016 (approx. US\$66 million stolen, but the criminals attempted to steal just under \$1 billion)
- North Korea provided the technical capability for the computer hacking
- Hong Kong provides the shell companies for North Korean firms to evade UN sanctions and probably in the Bangladesh Bank heist (facilitator role)

27-Nov-S7mon

Case study 3: Possible alliance between North Korea and Chinese criminal gangs: Bangladesh Bank cyber helst

- Chinese criminals provided the links into the Philippines (Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.) as well as with the high roller gamblers and junket operators in China, Macau and Hong Kong
- They have an extensive presence in the Philippines illegal drug industry
- Detailed knowledge of the corruption in the Philippines banking industry (RCBC and PhilRem)
- Brought in high rollers and junket operators from China

27-Nov-17

Case study 4: The Vancouver (Canada) model

- Complex networks of criminal alliances
 - Chinese underground banks are at the heart of Chinese criminal activity
 - Money laundered from Vancouver Into/out of China and to other locations (Mexico, Colombia)
 - North American illegal drug networks
 - Supplied by Chinese (methamphetamines, precursor chemicals) and Latin American (cocaine) gangs
 - Facilitate capital flight from China
 - High rollers use Canadian casinos, role of Junket operators, investment in Canadian real estate

27-Nov-17

CONCLUSIONS

27-Nan-17

Conclusions

- Need to monitor trends in transnational criminal activity in China and Guangdong in particular
 - Major difficulties involved in such an approach
 - Expand existing joint work with Chinese law enforcement authorities
 - Encourage China to more strictly regulate the Chinese chemical industry limiting the production of precursor chemicals
 - Recognise that the Chinese themselves have a limited understanding of criminal activity in Guangdong (population of over 100 million) and very rapid economic growth and internal migration

27-100-17

Conclusions

- Intelligence gathering: Anticipating threats
 - Need for ongoing intelligence gathering to monitor new developments in money laundering
 - Chinese criminal gangs are innovative in developing new methods of smuggling money through financial markets
 - What are the "weak links" in the global and Australian financial system that that are likely to be targeted by cybercriminals?
 - Other "weak links" amongst SWIFT's members?

37-leav-17



Condusions

- China's future role in Australia's transnational crime
 - China's economy is changing away from a low wage and unskilled one towards service and high-tech industries (e.g., Guangdong in particular)
 - China's transnational criminal economy will also change
 - Implications?
 - Smaller role for low-end counterfeit goods in Guangdong and greater role of technology-intensive fakes
 - Likely impacts on money laundering?

Conclusions

- Possible scenario: Sydney as regional hub for Chinese transnational crime (the Vancouver model?)
 - Launder money into high-end real estate (capital flight)
 - Launder money through the high-roller tables in Sydney's casinos
 - Use Chinese and Australian banks, money transfer companies to shift money to/from China and other countries
 - Traffic illegal drugs from Guangdong and Latin America



Nanninga, Tanera AG:EX

From:

Godfrey, Sam AG:EX

Sent:

Monday, December 18, 2017 2:51 PM

To:

Nanninga, Tanera AG:EX

Subject:

FW: Call for Records MAG-2017-74219 Due December 27, 2017

Attachments:

slides20171127.pdf

Hi,

Below and attached is what I have on this request. Thanks. S.

Sam Godfrey

Ministerial Assistant to the Honourable David Eby, QC

Attorney General of British Columbia and Minister responsible for Liquor, Gaming and ICBC

Mobile: 250 208 1359 | Office: 250 952 7613

Rm 232, Parliament Buildings, 501 Belleville St., Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4

This message, including any attachments to it, is not to be disclosed outside of the Provincial Government without prior written approval from the Ministry of Attorney General. If you have received this communication in error, please destroy the email message and any attachments immediately and notify me by telephone or by email.

From: Smith, George AG:EX

Sent: Monday, December 4, 2017 11:37 AM

To: Godfrey, Sam AG:EX

Subject: FW: Sydney presentation

As discussed.

From: Smith, George AG:EX

Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 11:44 AM

To: Eby, David AG:EX

Subject: FW: Sydney presentation

Minister,

Here is a copy of the Sydney presentation re: "The Vancouver Model"

From: GEOSMITH [mailto:George.Smith@gov.bc.ca]

Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 11:42 AM

To: Smith, George AG:EX Subject: Sydney presentation

Impact of Chinese Transnational Crime on Australia: Intelligence Perspectives

Paper delivered at the New South Wales Police Force Ifocus Conference, November 2017

John Langdale
Department of Security Studies and Criminology
Macquarie University
john.langdale@mq.edu.au

27-Nov-17

Outline of presentation

- I focus on three issues in transnational crime from southern China which affect Australia
 - Supply side: southern China (Guangdong province)
 - -Facilitators: Hong Kong and Macau
 - Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs

27-Nov-1

Focus of presentation


- Supply side: Southern Chinese transnational crime (focus on Guangdong province)
 - Trafficking of illegal drugs (methamphetamines, precursor chemicals) to Australia
 - · Counterfeit goods trafficking
 - Associated money laundering flows back to China and Hong Kong
 - —Future changes in Guangdong: What are the implications for transnational crime?

27-Nov-17

Focus of presentation


- Transnational crime needs facilitators (bankers, accountants, lawyers) to arrange deals
 - Hong Kong is a key hub for these facilitators
 - Macau is a secondary hub
 - Implications for Australian money laundering?

27-How-1




- Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs: Impact on transnational criminal activity in Australia?
 - -Latin American criminal gangs
 - -European criminal gangs
 - -North Korea
 - -Vancouver (Canada)

22.Mon 17







Supply perspectives: Transnational crime and money laundering in southern China

27-Nov-17

Transnational crime in southern China

- Guangdong is a significant source of Australia's transnational crime
 - Illegal drugs (particularly precursor chemicals and methamphetamines)
 - Counterfeit goods
 - Wide range of transnational crime in Guangdong (illegal betting syndicates, illegal timber, ivory, wildlife, "boiler room" and fake CEO scams, etc)

17-Nov-1

Transnational crime in southern China

- Guangdong is an good location for production and trafficking of illegal goods and services
 - World-class global logistics networks underpinning trafficking of illegal drugs, counterfelt goods and other illegal activities
 - Presence of a skilled workforce and equipment (printers, packaging) as well as unskilled people wanting employment
 - Close proximity to business and financial services in Hong Kong
 - Strong linkages with the global Chinese diaspora

27-Mare 17

Transnational crime in southern China

- Complexity of criminal activity in Guangdong
 - Enormous difficulties in unraveling the criminal participants and money laundering intermediaries within the province and in Hong Kong
 - Flexible networks in the legal and illegal economies (complex and fluid sub-contracting networks)
 - Guangdong has changed significantly in the past ten years and will continue to change in the future
 - The province grew rapidly using low-wage migrant labour, but these workers are needed less now

22-Nov-17

Transnational crime in southern China

- · Complexity of criminal activity in Guangdong
 - Shift into high technology products and services industries
 - -Impacts on crime?
 - Fewer male migrant workers who were prone to join criminal gangs
 - Fewer low-end counterfeit factories (likely to have spread to other regions in China); more technology intensive fakes
 - More cyber crime given the higher technology skills of the workforce

27-Nov

Facilitators of Asian financial crime: Hong Kong and Macau

27-Nov-17

Hong Kong and Macau: Facilitators of Asian financial crime

"Mainland-based criminal groups typically engage in large-scale ATS production and export, while Hong Kong- and Taiwan-based groups finance large drug shipments in the role of lender and insurer. These latter criminal syndicates are involved in illicit market activities, protection services, loan sharking, 'money trail' avoidance services, and stock market manipulation, and use the financing of drug shipments as an investment." (Broadhurst, Roderic 2017 Asia's law enforcers face synthetic drug proliferation, Jane's Intelligence Review, 30 Je.)

Hong Kong and Macau: Facilitators of Asian financial

- Hong Kong and Macau play a significant role in facilitating transnational financial crime affecting Australia
- Hong Kong is a major centre for global and Asian banking and business services
- Macau has the world's largest casino turnover and a history of facilitating crime, money laundering and capital flight
- Both cities have well-established networks of facilitators skilled at shifting money overseas via offshore banking and finance

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Secrecy in Hong Kong's financial and business services
 - Hong Kong is ranked the second most secret offshore financial centre on the Tax Justice Network's global ranking
 - Hong Kong is a major global location for shell companies which are heavily used by Chinese, North Korean and global criminals
 - -They provide anonymity for criminals

37-Nov17

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Hong Kong plays a key role in offshore finance for China
 - The Panama Papers leak found that many wealthy and politically connected Chinese used Mossack Fonseca's services to access offshore markets
 - Mossack Fonseca is one of the many Hong Kong based financial intermediaries facilitating such transactions
 - Unfortunately, this type of information is rarely obtained

27 (to+1)

Hong Kong and Macau facilitate capital flight from China

- A complex topic that is beyond the scope of this presentation
- Most of the flows are not of concern to Australian law enforcement agencies (e.g., currency speculation and capital diversification)
- However, capital flight from corrupt Chinese officials and/or Chinese criminals is a concern
- Australia must rely on cooperation with the Chinese government

27-Mov 17

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Hong Kong provides global criminals with access to global financial markets
- Case study: The "Russian Laundromat"
 - Around US\$20 billion were laundered out of Russia by Russian criminals in the period 2010-14 (possibly up to US\$80 billion)
 - Hong Kong banks (HSBC, \$545 million) and Chinese banks (Bank of China, \$715 million) played a significant role in the laundering of Russian money
 - Unfortunately, this information is a one-off and it is difficult to follow it up given the hazards of investigating organised crime in Russia

27-Nov-17

Hong Kong: Facilitator of Asian financial crime

- Australian implications
 - "Russian Laundromat": No information on whether any money from the money laundered by Hong Kong based (or London) banks ended up in Australia
- Hong Kong plays a key destination role in money laundering of Australian illegal drug sales
- Panama Papers: The ATO has revealed that about 80 of the 800 Australians being Investigated following the Panama Papers leak match the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission's serious and organised crime intelligence database (including bikie gangs involved in various criminal activities)

Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs

27-Non-17

Global and local criminal gangs

- Europol has identified the growing problems faced by law enforcement agencies from global and European criminal gangs
 - Many Organised Crime Groups are highly flexible and display great adaptability in the speed with which they adjust their business models to changes in the environment. Many criminal groups are increasingly complex and require a variety of skills as well as technical expertise to carry out activities. (Europol 2017 European Union. Serious and Organised Crime Assessment. Brussels, p.11)
 - Europol has also identified that ethnic-based criminal gangs are forming alliances with other criminal groups

Chinese global criminal gangs

- Mahlmann, Ning-Ning 2005 Chinese Criminal Enterprises, Washington, D.C., FBI
- Key characteristics are:
 - Global linkages via the Chinese diaspora
 - Fluid nature of operations (form new ventures and dissolve them)
 - Sophisticated operations (High degree of coordination, planning and good technical and business knowledge)
 - Global mobility of members
 - Financial strength (Operate in legal and illegal businesse:
 profits from illegal activities are placed in legal firms
 and reinforce the group's financial strength)

Alliances between Chinese and global criminal gangs

- Australian law enforcement agencies face new challenges from alliances between Chinese, global and local criminal gangs
- Advantages of such alliances include:
 - Pool their respective strengths (Chinese criminal gangs have excellent global distribution networks)
 - Rapidly move into new markets and
 - Take advantage of weak links in the global economy
- The following four case studies illustrate these points

Case study 1: Alliances between Latin American and Chinese criminal gangs

- Traffic cocaine to Hong Kong for China and Asia-Pacific markets
- Money laundered from Colombia to Hong Kong as well as through Macau casinos
- Traffic precursor chemicals and counterfeit goods produced in Guangdong to Latin America and globally
- Parallels with the Black Market Peso Exchange used by Colombian criminal gangs for cocaine trafficking to the U.S.
- These gangs have also diversified into people smuggling from China to Latin America and then to the U.S.

Case study 1: Alliances between Latin American and Chinese criminal gangs

- These global criminal gangs are like multinational corporations which operate global networks and use the transport and business services infrastructure of southern China
- They trade opportunistically in what each region has specialised in (Southern China has methamphetamines, precursor chemicals, counterfeit goods and a supply of illegal migrants, while Latin America has cocaine)

27-Nov-17

Case study 2: Alliances between Chinese and European criminals

- The European alliance model is quite different from the first case study
- Spain: ICBC and European criminal gangs
- Italy: Bank of China and Italian criminal gangs
- While the case study does not involve Australia, it does provide a possible model for the Asia-Pacific region

27-Nov-17

Case study 2: Alliances between Chinese and European criminals

- Global implications?
 - Chinese criminal gangs operated a regional hub-andspoke operation with Tuscany in Italy and Madrid in Spain being the hubs; collected financial transfers within Europe, before sending them onto China
 - Imports of counterfeit goods, illegal drugs; local extortion, prostitution and sweat shops with illegal migrants; profits laundered out of Italy and Spain to China
 - Alliances with local criminal gangs (Camorra in Naples)
 - Key role of Chinese banks and money transfer services in money laundering

Global implications of European case studies

- Do Chinese criminal gangs operate regional huband-spoke operations in (the Asia-Pacific?
 - Have Chinese criminal gangs formed alliances with local criminal gangs? (e.g., bikie gangs in Australia?)
 - —If so, what are the money laundering implications?
 - —Are Chinese banks and money transfer firms operating in Australia engaged in money laundering activities similar to those in Europe?

Case study 3: History of alliances between North Korea and Chinese criminal gangs

- Illegal drug production (North Korea) and global distribution (Chinese criminal gangs) (1990s and early-2000s)
 - Australian case study: Pong Su case in 2003 (Up to 125kg of heroin was imported)
- Counterfeit cigarettes: North Korea (production) and Taiwanese and Chinese criminal gangs (global distribution)
- Banco Delta Asia case in 2005 (counterfeit US\$100 notes) produced by North Korea and distributed by Chinese banks

Case study 3: Possible alliance between North Korea and Chinese criminal gangs

- Bangladesh Bank cyber heist of 2016 (approx. US\$66 million stolen, but the criminals attempted to steal just under \$1 billion)
- North Korea provided the technical capability for the computer hacking
- Hong Kong provides the shell companies for North Korean firms to evade UN sanctions and probably in the Bangladesh Bank heist (facilitator role)

27-Now-17-trong

Case study 3: Possible alliance between North Korea and Chinese criminal gangs: Bangladesh Bank cyber heist

- Chinese criminals provided the links into the Philippines (Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.) as well as with the high roller gamblers and junket operators in China, Macau and Hong Kong
- They have an extensive presence in the Philippines illegal drug industry
- Detailed knowledge of the corruption in the Philippines banking industry (RCBC and PhilRem)
- Brought in high rollers and junket operators from China

27-Nov-17

Case study 4: The Vancouver (Canada) model

- Complex networks of criminal alliances
 - Chinese underground banks are at the heart of Chinese criminal activity
 - Money laundered from Vancouver Into/out of China and to other locations (Mexico, Colombia)
 - North American illegal drug networks
 - Supplied by Chinese (methamphetamines, precursor chemicals) and Latin American (cocaine) gangs
 - Facilitate capital flight from China
 - High rollers use Canadian casinos, role of Junket operators, investment in Canadian real estate

27-160+37

CONCLUSIONS

27-Nov-1

Conclusions

- Need to monitor trends in transnational criminal activity in China and Guangdong in particular
 - Major difficulties involved in such an approach
 - Expand existing joint work with Chinese law enforcement authorities
 - Encourage China to more strictly regulate the Chinese chemical industry limiting the production of precursor chemicals
 - Recognise that the Chinese themselves have a limited understanding of criminal activity in Guangdong (population of over 100 million) and very rapid economic growth and internal migration

27-Nov-17

Conclusions

- Intelligence gathering: Anticipating threats
 - Need for ongoing intelligence gathering to monitor new developments in money laundering
 - Chinese criminal gangs are innovative in developing new methods of smuggling money through financial markets
 - What are the "weak links" in the global and Australian financial system that that are likely to be targeted by cybercriminals?
 - Other "weak links" amongst SWIFT's members?

27-hor-17



Condusions

- China's future role in Australia's transnational crime
 - China's economy is changing away from a low wage and unskilled one towards service and high-tech industries (e.g., Guangdong in particular)
 - China's transnational criminal economy will also change
 - Implications?
 - Smaller role for low-end counterfeit goods in Guangdong and greater role of technology-intensive fakes
 - · Likely impacts on money laundering?

27.80mm 97

Conclusions

- Possible scenario: Sydney as regional hub for Chinese transnational crime (the Vancouver model?)
 - Launder money into high-end real estate (capital flight)
 - Launder money through the high-roller tables in Sydney's casinos
 - Use Chinese and Australian banks, money transfer companies to shift money to/from China and other countries
 - Traffic illegal drugs from Guangdong and Latin America



Dayman, Marlene JAG:EX

From:

Harris, Megan A GCPE:EX

Sent:

Friday, September 22, 2017 9:57 AM

To:

Fyfe, Richard J JAG:EX; Mazure, John C FIN:EX; Meilleur, Len FIN:EX; Pandachuck, Niki

FIN:EX

Subject:

NR FINAL - Report on anti-money laundering released, review to follow

Attachments:

2017AG0024-001625.pdf

Importance:

High

Attached is the final NR going provincewide in the matter of moments.

For Immediate Release 2017AG0024-001625 Sept. 22, 2017

Ministry of Attorney General

NEWS RELEASE

Report on anti-money laundering released, review to follow

VICTORIA - The Government of B.C. has released a 2016 report commissioned to look at practices and the regulatory regime related to suspicious cash transactions at B.C. gaming facilities.

"On assuming responsibility for gambling in B.C. as part of my ministerial duties, I received a series of briefings that caused me to believe that our province could do more to combat money laundering at B.C. casinos," said Attorney General David Eby. "During these discussions, a publicly funded report that had been commissioned to review antimoney laundering policy and practices in B.C. was shared with me. This report makes a series of serious recommendations for reform, which should have been made public at the time the report was complete. I am making that report public today."

In the coming weeks, the Attorney General will announce the appointment of an independent expert to review whether there is an unaddressed, or inadequately addressed, issue of money laundering in Lower Mainland casinos.

"Criminal activity and money laundering in our casinos and elsewhere in B.C. will not be tolerated," said Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General Mike Farnworth. "These investigations take time because of the many moving pieces and players but JIGIT, which operates under the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit, and GPEB have had good success so far and we fully expect that to continue."

"We take our responsibility to manage gaming in our province very seriously and always welcome the opportunity to improve our practices," said BCLC president and CEO Jim Lightbody. "We have zero tolerance for criminals who may attempt to target our business. If there is something more we can do to improve the anti-money laundering efforts in B.C., we'll do it."

"The problem of money laundering is complex, but a committed government can make a difference," said Eby. "We are serious about doing everything we can to identify money laundering activities, and ensure policies are in place to prevent it from occurring in B.C. casinos. We will bring in the best experts available to assist us, and I am confident we will succeed, especially with the continued support of our partners BCLC, casino operators, the police, and the Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch."

A copy of the MNP Report can be found at: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/sports-recreation-arts-and-culture/gambling/gambling-in-bc/reports/mnp_report-redacted.pdf

For a link to BCLC's response to the MNP report and other relative reports: http://corporate.bc/c.com/who-we-are/corporate-reports/reports-disclosures.html

Quick Facts:

- * BCLC is responsible for conduct and management of gambling in B.C.
- * GPEB is responsible for the overall integrity of gambling and horse racing in the province.
- * MNP LLP were engaged by GPEB to conduct the review on Sept. 8, 2015 and delivered the report on July 26, 2016.
- * In 1998, the Province added casino gambling to the responsibilities of the BC Lottery Corporation and made them responsible for the operation of the casino industry in B.C.
- * In April 2016, GPEB worked with the Policing and Security Branch in the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General and the RCMP to establish the Joint Illegal Gaming Investigation Team (JIGIT). JIGIT, a unit under CFSEU-BC, provides a co-ordinated enforcement approach from police and GPEB to combat illegal gambling and money laundering in B.C.
- * GPEB has also established an intelligence unit to provide government with situational awareness of threats to the integrity of the gambling industry.

Contact:

Government Communications and Public Engagement Ministry of Attorney General 778 678-1572

Connect with the Province of B.C. at: www.gov.bc.ca/connect



NEWS RELEASE

For Immediate Release 2017AG0024-001625 Sept. 22, 2017

Ministry of Attorney General

Report on anti-money laundering released, review to follow

VICTORIA – The Government of B.C. has released a 2016 report commissioned to look at practices and the regulatory regime related to suspicious cash transactions at B.C. gaming facilities.

"On assuming responsibility for gambling in B.C. as part of my ministerial duties, I received a series of briefings that caused me to believe that our province could do more to combat money laundering at B.C. casinos," said Attorney General David Eby. "During these discussions, a publicly funded report that had been commissioned to review anti-money laundering policy and practices in B.C. was shared with me. This report makes a series of serious recommendations for reform, which should have been made public at the time the report was complete. I am making that report public today."

In the coming weeks, the Attorney General will announce the appointment of an independent expert to review whether there is an unaddressed, or inadequately addressed, issue of money laundering in Lower Mainland casinos.

"Criminal activity and money laundering in our casinos and elsewhere in B.C. will not be tolerated," said Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General Mike Farnworth. "These investigations take time because of the many moving pieces and players but JIGIT, which operates under the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit, and GPEB have had good success so far and we fully expect that to continue."

"We take our responsibility to manage gaming in our province very seriously and always welcome the opportunity to improve our practices," said BCLC president and CEO Jim Lightbody. "We have zero tolerance for criminals who may attempt to target our business. If there is something more we can do to improve the anti-money laundering efforts in B.C., we'll do it."

"The problem of money laundering is complex, but a committed government can make a difference," said Eby: "We are serious about doing everything we can to identify money laundering activities, and ensure policies are in place to prevent it from occurring in B.C. casinos. We will bring in the best experts available to assist us, and I am confident we will succeed, especially with the continued support of our partners BCLC, casino operators, the police, and the Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch."

A copy of the MNP Report can be found at: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/sports-recreation-arts-and-culture/gambling/gambling-in-bc/reports/mnp_report-redacted.pdf

For a link to BCLC's response to the MNP report and other relative reports: http://corporate.bclc.com/who-we-are/corporate-reports/reports-disclosures.html

Quick Facts:

- BCLC is responsible for conduct and management of gambling in B.C.
- GPEB is responsible for the overall integrity of gambling and horse racing in the province.
- MNP LLP were engaged by GPEB to conduct the review on Sept. 8, 2015 and delivered the report on July 26, 2016.
- In 1998, the Province added casino gambling to the responsibilities of the BC Lottery
 Corporation and made them responsible for the operation of the casino industry in B.C.
- In April 2016, GPEB worked with the Policing and Security Branch in the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General and the RCMP to establish the Joint Illegal Gaming Investigation Team (JIGIT). JIGIT, a unit under CFSEU-BC, provides a co-ordinated enforcement approach from police and GPEB to combat illegal gambling and money laundering in B.C.
- GPEB has also established an intelligence unit to provide government with situational awareness of threats to the integrity of the gambling industry.

Contact:

Government Communications and Public Engagement
Ministry of Attorney General
778 678-1572

Connect with the Province of B.C. at: www.gov.bc.ca/connect